Global Environmental Governance: A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate

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“Within the context of the evolution of global environmental politics and policy, the end goal of global environmental governance is to improve the state of the environment and to eventually lead to the broader goal of sustainable development.”

“Although the debate on GEG has focused overwhelmingly on reform of the UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), the issue is far more expansive. This is largely because, since 1972, the business of global environmental governance has grown in many new directions.”

“…it is clear that while the system of global environmental governance has grown in size and scope, it has not been entirely effective in achieving its larger goal of actually improving the global environment, of achieving sustainable development, or even of reversing the major trends of degradation.”

This chapter is a primer on the global environmental governance (GEG) reform debate to date. The chapter is neither a critical assessment of the debate nor an exhaustive summary of its various strands. We do not seek to assess the viability of particular proposals, nor to prescribe the desirability of particular directions. Instead, the goals of this chapter are to (a) briefly highlight the key aspects of the evolution of GEG; (b) identify the challenges that have accompanied this evolution; (c) categorize broad archetypes of reform packages that have been proposed; and (d) provide a snapshot of some of the ongoing and recent GEG reform initiatives. This will be followed in Chapter 2 (Global Environmental Governance: A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate) by a more analytical diagnosis of the key strands of concern identified in this first chapter and then Chapter 3 (Global Environmental Governance: A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate) offers a set of recommendations.

An Evolving System of Global Environmental Governance

GEG refers to the sum of organizations, policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, procedures and norms that regulate global environmental protection. Within the context of the evolution of global environmental politics and policy, the end goal of global environmental governance is to improve the state of the environment and to eventually lead to the broader goal of sustainable development. The focus of this book, as mentioned earlier, is on environmental governance in the context of sustainable development.

The major institutional decision coming out of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972) was the establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which was created to play the lead role in GEG by coordinating environmental activities within the UN agencies and acting as a catalyst for new initiatives. Since then, the world has seen hectic activity in global environmental policy (and, more recently, in sustainable development policy) and a host of treaties, organizations and mechanisms have emerged. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the 2002 Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development mark just two of the many policy landmarks of this rapid evolution of the GEG system.[1]

Over the last few years a heated debate has emerged among policymakers as well as scholars on the possible need and potential directions of a reform in the GEG system so that it can keep up with its own rapid evolution. Although the debate on GEG has focused overwhelmingly on reform of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the issue is far more expansive. This is largely because, since 1972, the business of global environmental governance has grown in many new directions. Much of this evolution is, in fact, quite positive and points to an expanded (certainly busier) global system of environmental governance. In particular, the GEG system has expanded in three ways:[2]

More Actors

  • There has been a proliferation of international environmental institutions within the UN system, such as the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the Environmental Management Group (EMG). Over 30 UN Agencies and programs now have a stake in environmental management. Major institutions, such as the World Bank as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO), now claim sustainable development to be central to their their overarching goals. A similar growth of interest is also seen within non-UN international and regional institutions in terms of environmental and sustainable development concerns.
  • The proliferation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) has also led to a mushrooming of specialized MEA secretariats and epistemic communities dealing with and providing intergovernmental forums for different pieces of the global environmental agenda.
  • The interest in the global environment has been spurred by, and has also led to, an increasingly active and larger contingent of civil society actors influencing global environmental governance. Not only has the number of non-state actors influencing the GEG system increased, but these actors have also become more diverse and varied in their interests and in the ways in which they influence the system. They now include not only large international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but also networks of more community-based organizations, businesses and knowledge communities.

More Money

  • Multiple sources of funding for international environmental action are now available. These not only include the operational budgets of the various organizations but also specialized funding mechanisms created either as part of specific treaties or in general. For example, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), created in 1991 has financed US$4.8 billion in projects and generated co-financing of US$15.6 billion.[3]
  • In addition, there are also substantial amounts available from donor aid flows, international organizations, UN agencies and international NGOs for environmental projects.
  • While the sum of these monies probably pales in comparison to the enormity of the global challenges, the amounts are fairly large nonetheless. The sources of funds vary greatly as do the destinations.

More Rules and Norms

  • According to some estimates, over 500 MEAs have been signed. While most of these are regional and minilateral arrangements, a significant number are truly global in nature. Arguably, environment is the second most common area of global rule-making after international trade (although environmental treaties tend to be more declaratory than most trade agreements which are more rule-based). In particular, there was a burst of activity in terms of new high-profile agreements in the immediate aftermath of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit; these agreements are only now reaching maturity and many are still in the pre-implementation phase.[4]
  • Rules and norms on the environment are being created with increasing frequency by non-environmental regimes, including, for example, the World Trade Organization, the Millennium Development Goals, lending policy safeguards of the International Finance Corporation and of major private banks, etc.
  • The greater buy-in into the concept of sustainable development from international organizations, civil society, national governments and the private sector has also led these organizations to begin articulating norms and (sometimes) policies aimed at global environmental improvement and the quest for sustainable development.[5]

The expanded engagement in GEG along these various dimensions is generally a positive development. However, in spite of the considerable increase in institutional, human and financial resources dedicated to GEG and despite environmental quality achievements in a few areas, the global commons continue to degrade at an alarming rate. Given the reality of increasing carbon emissions, dwindling forest cover, declining fish stocks and disappearing biodiversity, it is clear that while the system of global environmental governance has grown in size and scope, it has not been entirely effective in achieving its larger goals of actually improving the global environment, of achieving sustainable development or even of reversing the major trends of degradation. In fairness, it may be too soon to seek such results from a system that is still evolving. Yet, it seems that the very evolution of the GEG system might have created new institutional challenges for the system itself. In other words, the rapid evolution of global environmental governance has led the system to outgrow itself.

Through a review of the now sizeable literature on GEG and discussions with the project Advisory Group, we have identified six broad areas of concern that are usually cited as needing attention:

  1. Proliferation of MEAs and fragmentation of GEG
  2. Lack of cooperation and coordination among international organizations
  3. Lack of implementation, enforcement, and effectiveness in GEG
  4. Inefficient use of resources
  5. GEG outside the environmental arena
  6. Non-state actors in a state-centric system

Here we will briefly identify the concerns that are usually cited under each of these headings. [[Chapter 2 (Global Environmental Governance: A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate)]2] will then be organized around these six themes and will analyze each of these areas of concern separately.

  1. Proliferation of MEAs and fragmentation of GEG. There are too many organizations engaged in environmental governance in too many different places, often with duplicative mandates. The MEA secretariats are located in disparate parts of the world, have varying levels of autonomy and focus on separate, but interrelated, environmental problems. For example, the climate (Climate change) secretariat is administered by the UN secretariat whereas the ozone and biodiversity secretariats report to UNEP. The Convention on Biodiversity is located in Montreal; Desertification and the UNFCCC in Bonn; CITES and the Basel Convention in Geneva. Fragmentation can lead to conflicting agendas, geographical dispersion and inconsistency in rules and norms, as the different secretariats have limited opportunity to interact and cooperate. Geographical dispersion leads to higher travel and personnel costs, larger reporting burdens and “negotiating fatigue.” In particular, this drains scarce human and institutional resources in developing countries and tends to distract the best resources towards global governance rather than towards national implementation.
  2. Lack of cooperation and coordination among international organizations. The concern here is about the absence of any meaningful coordination mechanisms for GEG. Theoretically, such coordination is part of UNEP’s natural mandate. However, UNEP has never been given the resources or the political capital to fulfill this mandate. UNEP’s ability to “coordinate” other UN agencies is further hampered by the sheer number of agencies and programs in the UN that have some stake in environmental protection. The creation of the GEF as the main financing mechanism, the various MEA secretariats, and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) have detracted from UNEP’s authority and led to fractious turf wars and inter-agency politics. A climate of inter-agency distrust, uneven resource endowments and unclear (and sometimes contradictory) mandates from the Member States has not been conducive to either institutional cooperation or coordination.
  3. Lack of implementation, enforcement and effectiveness in GEG. The GEG system has turned into a “negotiating system” that seems to be in a perpetual state of negotiation and is obsessed with continuing negotiations rather than thinking about the implementation of existing agreements. The implementation deficit is compounded by the fact that there is a dearth of enforcement mechanisms and little to no focus on ensuring that the instruments are effective in meeting their original objectives. The environmental system contains no meaningful dispute settlement body and few options are available to ensure or enforce compliance. As with many other international processes and institutions, consensus building in MEA negotiations is driven more by political feasibility than by science. This problem, of course, is endemic to international organizations and is not unique to the GEG system. However, ignoring science in the case of complex and long-term environmental processes can have much higher costs and more lasting effects than in many other arenas.
  4. Inefficient use of resources. The concern that is usually raised here is that the system as a whole seems to have significant (even if insufficient) resources, but the duplication and lack of coordination within the system can mean that resources are not always used most efficiently. In 2000, for example, the World Bank had an active portfolio of over US$5 billion in environmental projects, the UNDP’s portfolio was over US$1.2 billion in the same year, and the GEF has funded over US$4.5 billion of projects since its inception.[6] National governments, civil society and the private sector in aggregate also expend significant financial resources on environmental projects. In spite of this impressive pool of money, particular elements of the system remain chronically under-funded. Geographic fragmentation and duplication of activities can result in higher operational costs and inefficient use of resources. With greater coherence in the system of governance and financing, a great deal more could be achieved with the existing resources.
  5. GEG outside the environmental arena. An increasing number of important decisions affecting environmental governance now take place outside the environmental arena, in areas such as trade, investment and international development. While institutions like the WTO, UNDP and the World Bank have begun to pay much more attention to environment and sustainable development than in the past, they still remain largely outside the discussions on global environmental governance. Or, rather, environmental actors remain at the periphery of decisions about environmental governance. For the most part, environmental decision-makers tend to talk only to each other and are neither invited to be, nor make an effort to be, meaningfully involved in broader development decision-making. Additionally, health and security issues are increasingly being linked to GEG. For the system of global environmental governance as a whole to be effective, it needs to find ways to link more meaningfully to other areas on global policy, to mainstream environmental considerations into economic and security decisions, and to ensure meaningful coherence between environmental and other global public policy spheres.
  6. Non-state actors in a state-centric system. The institutions engaged in global environmental governance are designed to be state-centric. However, civil society actors, such as environmental NGOs and business, are playing an increasingly large role in global environmental policy-making. Environmental NGOs have played important roles in stimulating international conventions, drafting treaties, providing scientific information and monitoring implementation. NGOs can also be critical in environmental implementation. The private sector is becoming increasingly engaged in GEG through voluntary commitments and public-private partnerships. The GEG system, however, was not designed to accommodate these myriad non-state actors. The challenge for GEG is to create the institutional space to allow non-state actors to realize their full potential.

There is much debate among scholars and practitioners about the actual importance of these various “deficiencies.” However, there is a general consensus among policy-makers and scholars that we should invest some thought into improving the system as it now exists. There is also an emerging sense that the discussion of GEG reform must go beyond simply reform of UNEP, to envision a system wherein the many different parts can interact more efficiently and effectively in realizing the ultimate goals of environmental protection and sustainable development.

In reviewing the evolution of the GEG system and the emergence of these challenges, it seems that the problem is not so much that the system is deficient, but rather that the system has outgrown its own design and is no longer able to cope with new realities. Indeed, many of the concerns we have identified are there precisely because the system has been successful in growing very fast and because of the resultant increase in the number of instruments and institutions for GEG. Such a perspective suggests that the challenge is not one of “fixing” a system that is broken; rather it is one of updating the system to meet the realities and challenges of its own evolution.

Models of Global Environmental Governance Reform

Improving global environmental governance has been an issue of dynamic debate in academic and policy-making circles ever since environmental issues entered the international agenda in the 1970s. Since then, both environmental threats and international responses to them have increased in their number and complexity. The key challenge of global environmental governance has, however, remained the same: how to design an institutional framework (system) that would best protect the global environment.

Model #1. The Compliance Model

Description: Advocates creation of a body that could provide binding decisions to hold states and private actors accountable for non-compliance with MEAs and resulting environmental damage.

Designs: Several potential bodies with such enforcement powers have been proposed. First, a World Environment Court[7] is envisioned as a permanent institution along the lines of the European Court of Human Rights, to ensure compliance with MEAs and upholding the new right to a healthy environment. Second, upgrading the Trusteeship Council[8] to have authority over global commons and also represent interests of potential beneficiaries of the trust, especially future generations. Third, reinterpreting the mandate of the Security Council[9] to include environmental security, when it has already accommodated non-traditional threats such as humanitarian emergencies and gross violations of human rights.

Potential: Ideally, the compliance model would solve the free rider problem, ensure care for the global commons, match judicial enforcement available elsewhere (especially in the WTO), enhance predictability and intergenerational concern of environmental law and directly impact compliance with MEAs. In practice, states are reluctant to expose themselves to the compliance body’s oversight and value judgments. There is a history of avoiding third party adjudication in international environmental law; inability to punish global commons’ violators by exclusion or fines; and low support for the exercise of “enforcement” provisions. Finally, the probability of all states voluntarily accepting the compliance model is extremely low.

Model #2. The New Agency Model

Description: Refers to creating a new organization outside UNEP with concentrated environmental responsibilities and the ability to steer UN agencies in relation to environmental issues.

Designs: The most ambitious designs of the new agency require joining environmental and development programs and agencies (UNEP, CSD, UNDP and others) within a World Organization for Environment and Development[10] or a World Sustainable Development Organization.[11] Other proposals include creating a Global Environmental Organization,[12] modelled after the WTO, with broad rule-making authority to address market failures and facilitate negotiation of international standards to be implemented by all countries. Other designs use the Global Environment Facility as a role model[13] for governance; advocate strengthening the role of ECOSOC and CSD[14] in discussing and overseeing system-wide coordination; propose an organization for environmental bargaining[15] to trade environmental goods for money; or aim to reinforce G8 with leader-level G20[16] to serve as a platform for building the new agency.

Potential: Creation of a new agency is an opportunity to put together the best features of existing agencies and guide global environmental policy-making. Such an agency could address the problems of fragmentation and weakness of environmental governance within the UN system. However, putting all environmental agreements under one umbrella would be a major challenge, because the current system is strongly decentralized and individual environmental entities strongly resist takeovers. Putting Bretton Woods institutions under the same umbrella seems even less realistic. Benefits of the new agency remain uncertain: it can potentially promote cooperation and increase states’ environmental concern, but it risks being another big bureaucracy with modest civil society influence and no additional financial and technology transfer to developing countries.[17]

Model #3. Upgrading UNEP Model

Description: Takes UNEP as a departure point for improving environmental governance and suggests upgrading it to a specialized agency to strengthen its status.

Designs: This model is similar to the previous but distinct in that it seeks the strengthening of UNEP rather than its replacement by a different super-organization. UNEP itself has been both an active participant and a focus of the reform debate.[18] It has faced significant challenges since its creation (limiting legal mandate, lack of funds, location). The most broadly discussed proposal is upgrading UNEP to a specialized agency[19] so that it can adopt treaties, have its own budget and potentially use innovative financial mechanisms. UNEP would strengthen its role as an “anchor” institution[20] for global environment by drawing on its ability to serve as information and capacity clearinghouse and set broad policy guidelines for action within the Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF). Similarly, it has been suggested that UNEP could be upgraded into a decentralized United Nations Environment Organization[21] (UNEO). UNEO would have its own legal identity, and would comprise general assembly, executive structure and secretariat. It would incorporate UNEP and GMEF; take up UNEP’s mandate with respect to its normative function; and serve as the authority for environment within the UN system.

Potential: The current debate on environmental governance seems to converge around the proposal to upgrade UNEP into a specialized agency as a middle ground between making a major change in the system and doing nothing. Upgrading UNEP requires less financial and diplomatic investment than adding a completely new organization. While UNEP has a record of institutional success and learning, its potential to perform when given better legal status, more funds and more staff is promising. On the downside, focusing reform debate only on UNEP distracts us from the broader institutional challenges, and it is not yet clear just how much of a difference specialized agency status will actually give.[22]

Model #4. Organizational Streamlining Model

Description: Addresses the need for improved coordination and synergies among various entities within the system of global environmental governance.

Designs: Improving coordination is work in progress and an ongoing challenge within the UN system. Integrating environmental institutions into clusters (or clustering[23]) has been discussed as a way to achieve goals of environmental conventions, while also pursuing efficiency gains and improving coherence of environmental governance. Clusters can be issue-based, functional/organizational, or they can have a particular regional scope (co-location and “merger” of secretariats). Another way to achieve synergies involves addressing duplication and overlaps by clarifying mandates of different entities, addressing their conflicting agendas and building upon their interlinkages.[24] The inconsistencies between global trade rules and MEAs illustrate the need for organizational streamlining. Finally there is implementation streamlining with states to develop plans for coordinating the implementation of the Rio Conventions on climate change (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (full text)), desertification and biological diversity (Convention on Biological Diversity).

Potential: Institutional fragmentation is not without its advantages:[25] it increases visibility of environmental protection, promotes specialization and innovation, and increases commitments of states that host secretariats. Some degree of redundancy is also desirable as it functions as insurance against institutional decline.[26] However, fragmentation has many disadvantages including institutional overlap, high financial and administrative costs, and increased reporting demands felt especially in developing countries. The effect of these disadvantages is reduction of state participation and decrease in implementation of environmental law. All organizational streamlining proposals need to be well designed in order to contribute to the solution of the problem. Otherwise they may worsen the current situation.

Model #5.Multiple Actors Model

Description: Argues that the system of governance comprises multiple actors whose actions need to be mutually reinforcing and better coordinated. Without better integration of these multiple actors, organizational rearrangement cannot resolve institutional problems.

Designs: Multiplicity of actors and interactions form a multidimensional “system” of global environmental governance.[27] It includes states, international environmental organizations, related international organizations, civil society organizations, and public concern and action. Focus on organizations as a single dimension of governance distracts attention from the fact that institutional will is required to affect decision-making procedures and change institutional boundaries.[28] First reform proposal is to integrate environment into the larger context of sustainable development and to allow multiple organizations to flourish but create venues for these organizations to interact and “transact.” Preferring environmental to sustainable development governance may result in further marginalization of environmental problems on the international agenda, alienation of developing countries, and continuing regime clashes between environment and other relevant international regimes. A General Agreement on Environment and Development should be negotiated to codify universally accepted sustainable development principles and serve as an umbrella for existing MEAs.[29] The second reform proposal is to create multiple channels of implementation. The quality of global environmental governance will be increasingly determined by the interaction among five entities in implementation and the ability of the system to facilitate their interaction, e.g., through global public policy networks.[30]

Potential: This model adopts a broad definition of the problem of global environmental governance. Accordingly, the solutions proposed are broad and offer directions the system should follow, rather than specific organizational improvements. While organizational thinking leaves an illusion of control over governance, systems thinking acknowledges the messiness and uncertainty of the system. The complexity of today’s environmental threats like [[climate (Climate change)] change] and responses to them prove that multiple channels of implementation naturally emerge but can lack direction if one is not provided by the system. Whether the system is mature enough to reverse environmental degradation via strategic directions and normative guidance remains to be seen.

GEG Reform Initiatives and Why They Don’t Succeed

The United Nations appears to be in a continual state of reform. In fact, the earlier attempts at reforming the United Nations started literally months after the organization was created. Yet, it is not easy to bring about change in international organizations. Adding new elements and organizations has tended to be easy; changing existing ones next to impossible.

The story of attempts to reform global environmental governance has been exactly the same. The current wave of calls to reform UNEP can be traced back to the Nairobi Declaration of 1997, which attempted to revitalize an ailing UNEP whose authority had steadily diminished in the 1980s and 1990s (historians, however, could argue that reform was being sought even before that and in fact within months of the organization’s creation in 1972 there were discussions about how it could be changed).

In focusing on the recent demands for GEG reform, we find that calls for reform have been consistent over the last decade and have been consistently growing in intensity, both from within the UN and from national governments, academics and civil society. The following list provides an incomplete but representative sampling of some recent GEG reform initiatives:

  • UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, launched a UN-wide reform initiative (1997). Kofi Annan placed the issue of improving the coordination and effectiveness of environmental institutions on the international political agenda by releasing his 1997 program for reform Renewing the United Nations.[31]
  • The Nairobi Declaration on the Role and Mandate of UNEP (1997) restated UNEP’s role as the leading authority in the field of the environment. The Declaration was adopted by the UNEP Governing Council and endorsed by the UN General Assembly to revive UNEP and reestablish its authority, which had diminished since the creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD).[32]
  • The UN Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements (1997) was appointed by the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to focus on inter-agency linkages and the revitalization of UNEP. The Task Force’s recommendations were adopted by the General Assembly, leading to the creation of two new coordinating bodies: the Environmental Management Group (EMG) and the Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF).[33]
  • The Inter-agency Environment Management Group (1999) was established as a mechanism to provide UNEP with an effective and strong coordinating role within the UN system on environmental matters.
  • The Malmo Declaration (2000) was adopted by the GMEF. It requested that the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) review the requirements for an enhanced institutional structure for GEG, including how to strengthen UNEP and broaden its financial base and how to better incorporate non-state actors into the GEG system.[34]
  • The Cartagena Process (2000–2002) was initiated to assess options for reforming GEG. The 21st Session of the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GC/GMEF) convened the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or Their Representatives on International Environmental Governance (IGC/IEG) to assess the options for strengthening UNEP, improving the effectiveness of MEAs and improving international policymaking coherence. The report from the process was transmitted to the CSD and to the WSSD.[35]
  • The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (2002), adopted by the WSSD, called for the full implementation of the Cartagena decision.
  • The Eighth Special Session of the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum Jeju, Republic of Korea met to discuss progress on the Cartagena decision.[36]
  • French President, Jacques Chirac, calls for creation of a United Nations Environmental Organization (UNEO) at the UN General Assembly (2003). In response to President Chirac’s presentation, an informal working group was set up to facilitate dialogue among governments on UNEP reform.
  • The Bali Strategic Plan for Technical Support and Capacity-building was adopted by the GC/GMEF (2004). The Bali Plan outlined proposals for improving the capacity of developing countries and economies in transition to implement MEAs.
  • The UN Summit (2005) called for strengthening coordination within the framework of international environmental governance and for the integration of environmental activities at the operational level into the broader sustainable development framework.[37]
  • A High Level Panel on UN-wide Coherence in the Areas of Humanitarian Assistance, the Environment, and Development (2006) was created after the World Summit in New York (2005).

In addition, environmental NGOs and scholars have also been forwarding various recommendations on GEG reform. The World Resources Institute (WRI) in the USA, the Institute of Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) in France, Ecologic in Germany and the Global Environmental Governance Project at Yale University are just a few examples of institutes that have devoted considerable resources to examining this question. Numerous books have been published and journals launched on the issue of global environmental governance in the past decade. More recently, leaders such as the French President and the UN Secretary-General have all highlighted the need for GEG reform.

In spite of this long history of attempts to reform the GEG system and the obvious appetite for reform, real change remains elusive. There are a number of possible reasons for this, including:

  • There is inertia within the system and a desire to maintain the status quo. Although the UN has engaged in many self-reform initiatives, actors in the system have an incentive to maintain the status quo. Neither national delegates nor international environmental bureaucrats seem motivated to allow meaningful change in the terms of the GEG system; a system in which, despite all its faults, they feel comfortable and have learned to use to their individual and institutional advantage. The proposals that do emerge, such as those originating from the IEG Working Group, tend to advocate a soft approach and incremental change.
  • Lack of leadership. While those within the GEG system seem hamstrung by inertia, there is also an apparent lack of will and leadership by political leaders to take the initiative. Occasionally there have been a few calls for action, but these have mostly not gone beyond the declaratory phase.
  • Developing country concerns. Developing countries have legitimate concerns about the state of the international system. They are already distrustful of the international system in general and are especially concerned about the rapid growth of environmental instruments and its possible impacts on their economic growth. Although developing countries are not necessarily beholden to the status quo, they fear that any change will necessarily make things even worse from their perspective.
  • Institutional fiefdoms. UN institutions are often loath to let go of any part of their authority or competence even where overlap and duplication are obvious. Having already created a complex system of myriad interlocking and overlapping institutions we now find, not surprisingly, that each institution is passionately committed to its own perpetuation.
  • Lack of political will and the balance of national interests versus global environmental problems. National economic and security interests can often run counter to environmental concerns and, consequently, not all nations wish to have a strong system of GEG. Indeed, even when the logic of a stronger global environmental system is apparent, it tends to be overwhelmed by the fact that actors within the system are primarily charged with safeguarding their narrower national and institutional interests.
  • There is a marked retreat in the importance attached to environmental issues by the international community. This has been particularly apparent in the last few years as the new emphasis on international security has distracted attention from a host of other issues, including those related to the state of the global environment.

In spite of these constraints, the momentum for reform is present. We find at least three reasons why, despite these chronic problems, the search for GEG reform should continue and why there might even be some ripeness in the possibility of real reform:

  • First, there is a confluence of opinion between NGOs, academics and policy entrepreneurs within the system that reform is inevitable. Slowly, but perceptibly, the demand for reform is growing and with this growth the ability of the system to resist reform is also eroding. Indeed, the mounting level of activity and frustration in the reform debate may itself be providing a window of opportunity in which a set of practical and doable recommendations may have the chance to come to fruition.
  • Second, not only the number, but the nature of those calling for reform has changed. Such calls have recently begun to come from the highest levels of national government and many governments have become consistent in raising these calls at the highest levels. Additionally, high-level reform attempts that seek UN-wide as well as GEG reform are beginning to gather relatively greater political support and traction. This does not mean that new initiatives for system-wide reform would necessarily be any more successful than prior ones, but it does demonstrate that there are consistent and important demandeurs for change. The most recent among the many such processes is the recently launched High-Level Process for United Nations System-Wide Coherence in the areas of Humanitarian Assistance, Environment and Development.
  • Third, and most important, the collective and accumulated experience of numerous reform attempts have given the champions of reform a much clearer and better sense of which reform packages are, in fact, politically possible as well as conceptually desirable. One senses a moment of practical sobriety where “wild” proposals are no longer being thrown about, but also a setting in of the realization that change has to be more than just cosmetic if it is to bear the fruits of an improved global environment and a shift towards sustainable development.

Notes

This is a chapter from Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda (e-book). Previous: Introduction (Global Environmental Governance: A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate) (Global Environmental Governance: A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate) |Table of Contents (Global Environmental Governance: A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate)|Next: Chapter 2: Key Challenges to Effective Global Environmental Governance (Global Environmental Governance: A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate)


Citation

Najam, A., Papa, M., Taiyab, N., & Development, I. (2007). Global Environmental Governance: A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate. Retrieved from http://editors.eol.org/eoearth/wiki/Global_Environmental_Governance:_A_Primer_on_the_GEG_Reform_Debate
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