Count Arvid Bernard Horn (1664-1742), Swedish statesman, was born at Vuorentaka in Finland on April 6, 1664, of a noble but indigent family.
Arvid Horn
After completing his studies at
Åbo, he entered the
Swedish army and served for several years in the
Netherlands, in
Hungary under Prince Eugene, and in
Flanders under
Waldeck (
1690-
1695). He stood high in the favour of the young
Charles XII of Sweden and was one of his foremost generals in the earlier part of the
Great Northern War. In
1704 he was entrusted with his first diplomatic mission, the deposition of
Augustus II of Poland and the election of
Stanislaus I of Poland, a mission which he accomplished with distinguished ability but absolute unscrupulousness. Shortly afterwards he was besieged by Augustus in
Warsaw and compelled to surrender.
In
1705 he was made a Privy Councillor, in
1706 a count and in
1707 governor of Charles XII’s nephew, the young duke Charles Frederick of
Holstein-Gottorp[?]. In
1710 he succeeded Nils Gyldenstolpe as President of the
Privy Council Chancery. Transferred to the central point of the administration, he had ample opportunity of regarding with other eyes the situation of the kingdom, and in consequence of his remonstrances he fell rapidly in the favour of Charles XII. Both in
1710 and
1713 Horn was in favour of summoning the
estates, but when in
1714 the diet adopted an anti-monarchical attitude, he gravely warned and ultimately dissolved it. In Charles XII’s later years Horn had little to do with the administration. After the death of Charles XII, in
1718 it was Horn who persuaded the princess
Ulrica Eleonora of Sweden[?] to relinquish her hereditary claims and submit to be elected queen of Sweden. He protested against the queen’s autocratic behaviour, and resigned from the Privy Council.
He was elected
lantmarskalk[?] at the Riksdag of
1720, and contributed, on the resignation of Ulrica Eleonora, to the election of
Frederick of Hesse as king of Sweden, whose first act was to restore to him to the Privy Council and as President of its Chancery (Prime Minister). For the next eighteen years he so absolutely controlled both the foreign and the domestic affairs of Sweden that the period between
1720 and
1738 has well been called the Horn period. His services to his country were indeed inestimable. His strong hand kept the inevitable strife of the parliamentary factions within due limits, and it’ was entirely owing to his provident care that Sweden so rapidly recovered from the wretched condition in which the wars of Charles XII had plunged her. In his foreign policy Horn was extremely wary and cautious, yet without compromising either the independence or the self-respect of his country. He was, however, the promoter of a new principle of administration which in later days proved very dangerous to Sweden under ministers less capable than he was. This was to increase the influence of the diet and its secret committees in the solution of purely diplomatic questions, which should have been left entirely to the executive, thus weakening the central government and at the same time facilitating the interference of foreign Powers in Sweden’s domestic affairs. Not till
1731 was there any appearance of opposition in the diet to Horn’s "system"; but Horn, piqued by the growing coolness of the king, the same year offered his resignation, which was not accepted.
In 1734, however, the opposition was bold enough to denounce his neutrality on the occasion of the war of the Polish Succession, when Stanislaus I again appeared upon the scene as a candidate for the Polish throne; but Horn was still strong enough to prevent a rupture with Russia. Henceforth he was bitterly but unjustly accused of want of patriotism, and in 1738 was compelled at last to retire before the impetuous onslaught of the triumphant young Hat party. For the rest of his life he lived in retirement at his estate at Ekebyholm, where he died on April 17, 1742. Horn in many respects greatly resembled his contemporary Robert Walpole. The peculiar situation of Sweden, and the circumstances of his time, made his policy necessarily opportunist, but it was an opportunism based on excellent common sense.
See also: List of Swedish politicians