



Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars

Chaim Kaufmann

International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring, 1996), 136-175.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199621%2920%3A4%3C136%3APAISTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N>

International Security is currently published by The MIT Press.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/mitpress.html>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars

Chaim Kaufmann

Ethnic civil wars are burning in Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, and are threatening to break out in dozens of other places throughout the world.¹ Many of these conflicts are so violent, with so much violence directed against unarmed civilians, and are apparently intractable, that they have provoked calls for military intervention to stop them. As yet, however, the international community has done little and achieved less.

Advocates of international action seek to redress the failures of local political institutions and elites by brokering political power-sharing arrangements, by international conservatorship to rebuild a functioning state, or by reconstruction of exclusive ethnic identities into wider, inclusive civic identities.² Pessimists doubt these remedies, arguing that ethnic wars express primordial hatreds which cannot be reduced by outside intervention because they have been ingrained by long histories of inter-communal conflict.³

Chaim Kaufmann is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University.

The author's thanks are owed to many people. Robert Pape's extensive help made a decisive difference in the quality of the final product. Helpful criticism was provided by Henri Barkey, Richard Betts, Michael Desch, Matthew Evangelista, Charles Glaser, Emily Goldman, Robert Hayden, Ted Hopf, Stuart Kaufman, Rajan Menon, Bruce Moon, Roger Peterson, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, and the members of the PIPES Seminar at the University of Chicago.

1. Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 347-377, lists fifty current ethnic conflicts of which thirteen had each caused more than 100,000 deaths to date.

2. Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 3-20; William Pfaff, "Invitation to War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 97-109; John Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 237-263; Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," *Foreign Policy*, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132-144; I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267-273.

3. "Let no one think there is an easy or a simple solution to this tragedy," which results from "age-old animosities," said George Bush, "whatever pressure and means the international community brings to bear." Quoted in Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Urges UN to Back Force to Get Aid to Bosnia," *New York Times*, August 7, 1992. For similar views see Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times*, October 8, 1992; Charles Krauthammer, "Bosnian Analogies; Pick Your History, Pick Your Policy," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1993; Conor Cruise O'Brien, "The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism's Primordial Roots," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 142-149.

International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175

© 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Both sides in the current debate are wrong, because solutions to ethnic wars do not depend on their causes.

This paper offers a theory of how ethnic wars end, and proposes an intervention strategy based on it.⁴ The theory rests on two insights: First, in ethnic wars both hypernationalist mobilization rhetoric and real atrocities harden ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard. Second, intermingled population settlement patterns create real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic “cleansing,” and prevent de-escalation unless the groups are separated. As a result, restoring civil politics in multi-ethnic states shattered by war is impossible because the war itself destroys the possibilities for ethnic cooperation.

Stable resolutions of ethnic civil wars are possible, but only when the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves. Separation reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat, and largely eliminates both reasons and chances for ethnic cleansing of civilians. While ethnic fighting can be stopped by other means, such as peace enforcement by international forces or by a conquering empire, such peaces last only as long as the enforcers remain.

This means that to save lives threatened by genocide, the international community must abandon attempts to restore war-torn multi-ethnic states. Instead, it must facilitate and protect population movements to create true national homelands. Sovereignty is secondary: defensible ethnic enclaves reduce violence with or without independent sovereignty, while partition without separation does nothing to stop mass killing.⁵ Once massacres have taken place, ethnic cleansing will occur. The alternative is to let the *interahamwe* and the Chetniks “cleanse” their enemies in their own way.

4. Ethnic wars involve organized large-scale violence, whether by regular forces (Turkish or Iraqi operations against the Kurds) or highly mobilized civilian populations (the *interahamwe* in Rwanda or the Palestinian *intifada*). A frequent aspect is “ethnic cleansing”: efforts by members of one ethnic group to eliminate the population of another from a certain area by means such as discrimination, expropriation, terror, expulsion, and massacre. For proposals on managing ethnic rivalries involving lower levels of ethnic mobilization and violence, see Stephen Van Evera, “Managing the Eastern Crisis: Preventing War in the Former Soviet Empire,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 361–382; Ted Hopf, “Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 44–75.

5. Although ethnic partitions have often been justified on grounds of self-determination, the argument for separation here is based purely on humanitarian grounds. The first to argue publicly for partition as a humanitarian solution was John J. Mearsheimer, “Shrink Bosnia to Save It,” *New York Times*, March 31, 1993.

The remainder of this paper has three parts. The next part develops a theory of how ethnic wars end. Then, I present a strategy for international military intervention to stop ethnic wars and dampen future violence, and rebut possible objections to this strategy. The conclusion addresses the moral and political stakes in humanitarian intervention in ethnic conflicts.

How Ethnic Civil Wars End

Civil wars are not all alike.⁶ Ethnic conflicts are disputes between communities which see themselves as having distinct heritages, over the power relationship between the communities, while ideological civil wars are contests between factions within the same community over how that community should be governed.⁷ The key difference is the flexibility of individual loyalties, which are quite fluid in ideological conflicts, but almost completely rigid in ethnic wars.⁸

6. To avoid discounting fundamentally similar conflicts because of differences in international legal status, "civil" wars are defined here as those among "geographically contiguous people concerned about possibly having to live with one another in the same political unit after the conflict." Roy Licklider, "How Civil Wars End," in Licklider, ed., *Stopping the Killing* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), p. 9. Thus the Abkhazian rebellion in Georgia and the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan are both properly considered ethnic civil wars.

7. An ethnic group (or nation) is commonly defined as a body of individuals who purportedly share cultural or racial characteristics, especially common ancestry or territorial origin, which distinguish them from members of other groups. See Max Weber (Guenther Roth, and Claus Wittich, eds.), *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Vol. 1 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 389, 395; Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), pp. 14, 21. Opposing communities in ethnic civil conflicts hold irreconcilable visions of the identity, borders, and citizenship of the state. They do not seek to control a state whose identity all sides accept, but rather to redefine or divide the state itself. By contrast, ideological conflicts may be defined as those in which all sides share a common vision of community membership, a common preference for political organization of the community as a single state, and a common sense of the legitimate boundaries of that state. The opposing sides seek control of the state, not its division or destruction. It follows that some religious conflicts—those between confessions which see themselves as separate communities, as between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland—are best categorized with ethnic conflicts, while others—over interpretation of a shared religion, e.g., disputes over the social role of Islam in Iran, Algeria, and Egypt—should be considered ideological contests. On religious differences as ethnic divisions, see Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 491–509, at 491.

8. While the discussion below delineates ideal types, mixed cases occur. The key distinction is the extent to which mobilization appeals are based on race or confession (ethnic) rather than on political, economic, or social ideals (ideological). During the Cold War a number of Third World ethnic conflicts were misidentified by the superpowers as ideological struggles because local groups stressed ideology to gain outside support. In Angola the MPLA drew their support from the coastal Kimbundu tribe, the FNLA from the Bakongo in the north (and across the border in

The possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars follow from this fact. War hardens ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals become futile, which means that victory can be assured only by physical control over the territory in dispute. Ethnic wars also generate intense security dilemmas, both because the escalation of each side's mobilization rhetoric presents a real threat to the other, and even more because intermingled population settlement patterns create defensive vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities.

Once this occurs, the war cannot end until the security dilemma is reduced by physical separation of the rival groups. Solutions that aim at restoring multi-ethnic civil politics and at avoiding population transfers—such as power-sharing, state re-building, or identity reconstruction—cannot work because they do nothing to dampen the security dilemma, and because ethnic fears and hatreds hardened by war are extremely resistant to change.

The result is that ethnic wars can end in only three ways: with complete victory of one side; by temporary suppression of the conflict by third party military occupation; or by self-governance of separate communities. The record of the ethnic wars of the last half century bears this out.

THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC WAR

It is useful to compare characteristics of ethnic conflicts with those of ideological conflicts. The latter are competitions between the government and the rebels for the loyalties of the people.⁹ The critical features of these conflicts are that ideological loyalties are changeable and difficult to assess, and the same population serves as the shared mobilization base for both sides. As a result, winning the "hearts and minds" of the population is both possible and necessary for victory. The most important instruments are political, economic, and social reforms that redress popular grievances such as poverty, inequality, corruption, and physical insecurity. Control of access to population is also important, both

Zaire), and UNITA from Ovimbundu, Chokwe, and Nsangela in the interior and the south. The former were aided by the Soviets and the latter two, at various times, by both the United States and China. Daniel S. Papp, "The Angolan Civil War and Namibia," in David R. Smock, ed., *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993), pp. 161–196, 162–164.

9. Landmarks on counterinsurgency include John Maynard Dow, *Nation Building in Southeast Asia*, rev. ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Pruett Press, 1966); Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham, 1970); Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1977); D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

to allow recruitment and implementation of reform promises, and to block the enemy from these tasks.¹⁰ Population control, however, cannot be guaranteed solely by physical control over territory, but depends on careful intelligence, persuasion, and coercion. Purely military successes are often indecisive as long as the enemy's base of political support is undamaged.¹¹

Ethnic wars, however, have nearly the opposite properties. Individual loyalties are both rigid and transparent, while each side's mobilization base is limited to members of its own group in friendly-controlled territory. The result is that ethnic conflicts are primarily military struggles in which victory depends on physical control over the disputed territory, not on appeals to members of the other group.¹²

IDENTITY IN ETHNIC WARS. Competition to sway individual loyalties does not play an important role in ethnic civil wars, because ethnic identities are fixed by birth.¹³ While not everyone may be mobilized as an active fighter for

10. "Guerrillas are like fish, and the people are the water they swim in." Mao Zedong, quoted in Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, p. 21.

11. "Winning a military war in Vietnam will be a hollow victory if the country remains politically and economically unstable, for it is under these conditions that a 'defeated' Viet Cong will be able to regroup and begin anew a 'war of national liberation.'" Dow, *Nation Building*, p. viii.

12. A partial exception occurs under conditions of extreme power imbalance, when militants of the weaker ethnic group may have difficulty mobilizing co-ethnics, although this may be less because they do not desire ethnic autonomy or independence, than because they are not convinced that there is hope of successful resistance. The credibility of the PKK, for example, has been enhanced by military successes against Turkish forces. Henri Barkey, "Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 51-70, 53.

13. Constructivist scholars of nationalism would not agree, as they argue that ethnic identities are flexible social constructions, which can be manipulated by political entrepreneurs and more or less freely adopted or ignored by individuals. Key works include Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion, and Politics in North India* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983). Primordialists, by contrast, see ethnic identities as fixed by linguistic, racial, or religious background. Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, and Sacred Ties," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 8 (1957), pp. 130-145; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963). For a recent defense, see Alexander J. Motyl, "Inventing Invention: The Limits of National Identity Formation," in Michael Kennedy and Ronald Gregor Suny, eds., *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, book manuscript. A middle position, "perennialist," accepts that identities are social constructs but argues that their deep cultural and psychological roots make them extremely persistent, especially in literate cultures. See Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). In this paper I do not take a position on the initial sources of ethnic identities or on their malleability under conditions of low conflict, but argue that massive ethnic violence creates conditions which solidify both ethnic boundaries and inter-ethnic hostility.

his or her own group, hardly anyone ever fights for the opposing ethnic group.¹⁴

Different identity categories imply their own membership rules. Ideological identity is relatively soft, as it is a matter of individual belief, or sometimes of political behavior. Religious identities are harder, because while they also depend on belief, change generally requires formal acceptance by the new faith, which may be denied. Ethnic identities are hardest, since they depend on language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one can change.¹⁵

Ethnic identities are hardened further by intense conflict, so that leaders cannot broaden their appeals to include members of opposing groups.¹⁶ As ethnic conflicts escalate, populations come increasingly to hold enemy images of the other group, either because of deliberate efforts by elites to create such images or because of increasing real threats. The intensification of the war in Southeastern Turkey, for example, has led the Turkish public more and more to identify all Kurds with the PKK guerrillas, while even assimilated Kurds increasingly see the war as a struggle for survival.¹⁷ Following riots in Colombo in 1983 in which Sinhalese mobs killed 3,000 Tamils, even formerly liberal-minded Sinhalese came to view all Tamils as separatists: "They all say they are

14. Internal divisions may undermine the authority of group leaders or even lead to intra-group violence, but will not cause members of the community to defect to the enemy. The unpopularity of the Azeri regime in 1992 generated no support for concessions to Armenian territorial demands. Although there was a small-scale intra-Muslim war in the Bihać pocket in Northwest Bosnia from 1993 to August 1995, the anti-Sarajevo faction never surrendered any territory or Muslim civilians to the Serbs or Croats. Charles Lane, "The Real Story of Bihać," *The New Republic*, December 19, 1994, pp. 12–14; Roger Cohen, "Fratricide in Bosnia: Muslim vs. Muslim," *New York Times*, June 22, 1994.

15. High levels of intermarriage which produce children of mixed parentage could blur ethnic boundaries, but even levels of ethnic tension far short of war inhibit this. In Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s, Catholic-Protestant intermarriages averaged 3–4 per cent. In Yugoslavia intermarriage rose in 1950s and 1960s, fell in 1966–69 during a period of ethnic tension, then rose again, and finally declined after 1981 as ethnic tensions increased. Especially in divided societies, ethnic identity rules often account for the identification of children of mixed marriages. In Northern Ireland nearly every wife converts to her husband's church. In Rwanda, Hutu or Tutsi identity is inherited from the father. John H. Whyte, "How is the Boundary Maintained between the Two Communities in Northern Ireland?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1986), pp. 219–233; Ruža Petrović, "The Ethnic Identity of Parents and Children," *Yugoslavia Survey*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1991), pp. 63–76, 64; Alain Destexche, "The Third Genocide," *Foreign Policy*, No. 97 (Winter 1994–95), pp. 3–17, 6.

16. This does not occur in ideological civil wars, in which most people (except leaders whose commitments are widely known) can easily and quickly shift affiliations, although shifts may be the result of coercion as often as positive appeals.

17. Barkey, "Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma," pp. 57–58.

loyal to the government, but scratch a Tamil, any Tamil, and beneath the skin there is an Eelamist.”¹⁸ Non-ethnic identity categories, such as neighborhood and friendship, cannot compete: in 1994 much of the hierarchy of the Rwandan Catholic Church split on ethnic lines.¹⁹

Once the conflict reaches the level of large-scale violence, tales of atrocities—true or invented—perpetuated or planned against members of the group by the ethnic enemy provide hard-liners with an unanswerable argument. In March 1992 a Serb woman in Foča in Eastern Bosnia was convinced that “there were lists of Serbs who were marked for death. My two sons were down on the list to be slaughtered like pigs. I was listed under rape.” The fact that neither she nor other townspeople had seen any such lists did not prevent them from believing such tales without question.²⁰ The Croatian Ustasha in World War II went further, terrorizing Serbs in order to provoke a backlash that could then be used to mobilize Croats for defense against Serb retaliation.²¹

In this environment, cross-ethnic appeals are not likely to attract members of the other group. The Yugoslav Partisans in World War II are often credited with transcending the ethnic conflict between the Croatian Ustasha and the Serbian Chetniks with an anti-German, pan-Yugoslav program. In fact it did not work. Tito was a Croat, but Partisan officers as well as the rank and file were virtually all Serbs and Montenegrins.²² Only in 1944, when German withdrawal made Partisan victory certain, did Croats begin to join the Partisans in numbers, not because they preferred a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia to a Greater

18. Sinhalese businessman quoted in William McGowan, *Only Man is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri Lanka* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1992), p. 102.

19. Donatella Lorch, “The Rock that Crumbled: The Church in Rwanda,” *New York Times*, October 17, 1994.

20. Reported by Andrej Gustinčić of *Reuters*, cited in Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia* (New York: Penguin, 1992), p. 166. Another tactic used by extremists to radicalize co-ethnics is to accuse the other side of crimes similar to their own. In July 1992, amidst large-scale rape of Bosnian Muslim women by Serb forces, Bosnian Serbs accused Muslims of impregnating kidnapped Serb women in order to create a new race of Janissary soldiers. Roy Gutman, *A Witness to Genocide* (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. x.

21. Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 122.

22. Partisan (as well as Chetnik) leaders were recruited mainly from among pre-war Army officers. Throughout most of 1942, the Partisans fielded two Montenegrin and four Serbian battalions, leavened with just a few fighters of other nationalities. A. Pavelić, “How Many Non-Serbian Generals in 1941?” *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (January 1983), pp. 447–452; Anton Bebler, “Political Pluralism and the Yugoslav Professional Military,” in Jim Seroka and Vukašin Pavlović, eds., *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of Democratic Transformation* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 105–40, 106.

Croatia, but because they preferred a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia to a Yugoslavia cleansed of Croats.

In both Laos and Thailand in the 1960s, the hill people (Hmong) fought the lowland people (Laos and Thais). The Hmong in Laos called themselves anti-communists, while Hmong on the other side of the Mekong River turned to the Communist Party of Thailand. The ideological affiliations, however, were purely tactical; most Hmong in Laos lived in areas dominated by the communist Pathet Lao and so turned to the United States for support, while most Hmong in Thailand were fighting a U.S.-allied government. Although in both countries both communists and anti-communists offered political reform and economic development, cross-ethnic recruitment bore little fruit, and the outcomes of the rebellions were determined mainly by strictly military operations.²³

Ethnic war also shrinks scope for individual identity choice.²⁴ Even those who put little value on their ethnic identity are pressed towards ethnic mobilization for two reasons. First, extremists within each community are likely to impose sanctions on those who do not contribute to the cause. In 1992 the leader of the Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia was dismissed on the ground that he "was too much Bosnian, too little Croat."²⁵ Conciliation is easy to denounce as dangerous to group security or as actually traitorous. Such arguments drove nationalist extremists to overthrow President Makarios of Cyprus in 1974, to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, to massacre nearly the whole government of Rwanda in 1994, and to kill Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.²⁶

23. Because of pre-existing clan rivalries, some Hmong in Laos fought on the Pathet Lao side. Blaufarb, *Counterinsurgency Era*, pp. 128–204; T.A. Marks, "The Meo Hill Tribe Problem in Northern Thailand," *Asian Survey*, October 1973; R. Sean Randolph and W. Scott Thompson, *Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Developments* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 17.

24. The proportion of Yugoslav residents identifying themselves not by nationality but as "Yugoslavs" rose from 1.7 percent in the 1961 census to 5.4 percent in 1981, but fell to 3.0 percent in 1991. Ruža Petrović, "The National Structure of the Yugoslav Population," *Yugoslavia Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1973), pp. 1–22, 12; Petrović, "The National Composition of the Population," *Yugoslavia Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1983), pp. 21–34, 22; Petrović, "The National Composition of Yugoslavia's Population," *Yugoslavia Survey*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1992), pp. 3–24, 12.

25. *Balkan War Report*, February/March 1993, p. 14, quoted in Robert M. Hayden, "The Partition of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1990–1993," *RFE/RL Research Reports*, Vol. 2, No. 22 (May 29, 1993), pp. 2–3. See also Blaine Harden, "In Bosnia 'Disloyal' Serbs Share Plight of Opposition," *Washington Post*, August 24, 1992. Hutu leaders in refugee camps in Zaire have murdered people suspected of wanting to return to Rwanda. "Telling Tales," *Economist*, August 13, 1994, p. 39.

26. See Fred C. Iklé, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), on the problems of soft-liners in international wars.

Second and more important, identity is often imposed by the opposing group, specifically by its most murderous members. Assimilation or political passivity did no good for German Jews, Rwandan Tutsis, or Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh. A Bosnian Muslim schoolteacher recently lamented:

We never, until the war, thought of ourselves as Muslims. We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered, because we are Muslims, thing changed. The definition of who we are today has been determined by our killers.²⁷

Choice contracts further the longer the conflict continues. Multi-ethnic towns as yet untouched by war are swamped by radicalized refugees, undermining moderate leaders who preach tolerance.²⁸ For example, while a portion of the pre-war Serb population remained in Bosnian government-controlled Sarajevo when the fighting started, their numbers have declined as the government has taken on a more narrowly Muslim religious character over years of war, and pressure on Serbs has increased. Where 80,000 remained in July 1993, only 30,000 were left in August 1995.²⁹ The Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) showed remarkable restraint during the 1994 civil war, but since then the RPF has imprisoned tens of thousands of genocide suspects in appalling conditions, failed to prevent massacres of thousands of Hutu civilians in several incidents, and allowed Tutsi squatters to seize the property of many absent Hutus.³⁰

What can finally eliminate identity choice altogether is fear of genocide. The hypernationalist rhetoric used for group mobilization often includes images of the enemy group as a threat to the physical existence of the nation, in turn justifying unlimited violence against the ethnic enemy; this threatening discourse can usually be observed by members of the target group. Even worse are actual massacres of civilians, especially when condoned by leaders of the perpetrating group, which are virtually certain to convince the members of the targeted group that group defense is their only option.

A Tamil justifying the massacre of Sinhalese in Trinco in Northern Sri Lanka in 1987 explained:

27. Mikica Babić, quoted in Chris Hedges, "War Turns Sarajevo Away from Europe," *New York Times*, July 28, 1995.

28. Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), p. 363.

29. Jonathan S. Landay, "Loyal Serbs and Croats in Sarajevo See Woe in Partition of Bosnia," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 30, 1993; Tracy Wilkinson, "Sarajevo's Serbs Face a Dual Hostility," *Los Angeles Times*, July 10, 1995; "Bosnia: The Coffee-cup State," *Economist*, August 26, 1995, p. 43.

30. *Rwanda Human Rights Practices, 1994* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, March 1995); Donatella Lorch, "As Many as 2,000 are Reported Dead in Rwanda," *New York Times*, April 24, 1995.

This is a payback for [the massacres of] 1983 and all the years they attacked us, going back to 1956. Will it ever stop? I do not think it will. But at least with the Indians here now, we have some peace. If they were to leave, however, it would mean death to all Tamils. They will kill every one of us. If the Indian Army leaves, we will have to jump into the sea.³¹

IDENTIFYING LOYALTIES. A consequence of the hardness of ethnic identities is that in ethnic wars assessing individual loyalties is much easier than in ideological conflicts. Even if some members of both groups remain unmobilized, as long as virtually none actively support the other group, each side can treat all co-ethnics as friends without risk of coddling an enemy agent and can treat all members of the other group as enemies without risk of losing a recruit.

Although it often requires effort, each side can almost always identify members of its own and the other group in any territory it controls. Ethnicity can be identified by outward appearance, public or private records, and local social knowledge. In societies where ethnicity is important, it is often officially recorded in personal identity documents or in censuses. In 1994 Rwandan death squads used neighborhood target lists prepared in advance, as well as roadblocks that checked identity cards.³² In 1983 riots in Sri Lanka, Sinhalese mobs went through mixed neighborhoods selecting Tamil dwellings for destruction with the help of Buddhist monks carrying electoral lists.³³ While it might not have been possible to predict the Yugoslav civil war thirty years in advance, one could have identified the members of each of the warring groups from the 1961 census, which identified the nationality of all but 1.8 percent of the population.³⁴

Where public records are not adequate, private ones can be used instead. Pre-World War II Yugoslav censuses relied on church records.³⁵ Absent any records at all, reliable demographic intelligence can often be obtained from

31. McGowan, *Only Man is Vile*, p. 49. From 1987 to December 1989, the Indian Peacekeeping Force attempted to separate Sri Lankan and Tamil forces. The war continues.

32. Destexche, "Third Genocide," p. 8.

33. Lakshmanan Sabaratnam, "The Boundaries of the State and the State of Ethnic Boundaries: Sinhala-Tamil Relations in Sri Lankan History," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July 1987), pp. 291–316, 294.

34. Petrović, "National Structure of the Yugoslav Population," p. 12. Yugoslav censuses include extremely detailed nationality information, including migration between regions by nationality, ethnicity of partners in mixed marriages, ethnic identity of children of such marriages, and the percentage of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in each of the 106 municipalities in Bosnia. Petrović, "National Composition of Yugoslavia's Population" (1992); Petrović, "The Ethnic Identity of Parents and Children"; Dušan Breznik and Nada Raduški, "Demographic Characteristics of the Population of FR Yugoslavia by Nationality," *Yugoslavia Survey*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1993), pp. 3–44.

35. Breznik and Raduški, "Demographic Characteristics," p. 3, n. 2.

local co-ethnics. In 1988 a Tutsi mob attacking the Catholic mission in Ntega, Burundi, brought with them a former employee who knew the hiding places where Hutu refugees could be found.³⁶ Muslim survivors report that throughout Bosnia in 1992 Serb militias used prepared lists to eliminate the wealthy, the educated, religious leaders, government officials, and members of the Bosnian Home Guard or of the (Muslim) Party of Democratic Action.³⁷

Finally, in unprepared encounters ethnicity can often be gauged by outward appearance: Tutsis are generally tall and thin, while Hutus are relatively short and stocky; Russians are generally fairer than Kazakhs.³⁸ When physiognomy is ambiguous, other signs such as language or accent, surname, dress, posture, ritual mutilation, diet, habits, occupation, region or neighborhood within urban areas, or certain possessions may give clues. Residents of Zagreb, for example, are marked as Serbs by certain names, attendance at an Orthodox church, or possession of books printed in Cyrillic.³⁹

Perhaps the strongest evidence of intelligence reliability in ethnic conflicts is that—in dramatic contrast to ideological insurgencies—history records almost no instances of mistaken “cleansing” of co-ethnics.

THE DECISIVENESS OF TERRITORY. Another consequence of the hardness of ethnic identities is that population control depends wholly on territorial control. Since each side can recruit only from its own community and only in friendly-controlled territory, incentives to seize areas populated by co-ethnics are strong, as is the pressure to cleanse friendly-controlled territory of enemy ethnics by relocation to *de facto* concentration camps, expulsion, or massacre.⁴⁰

Because of the decisiveness of territorial control, military strategy in ethnic wars is very different than in ideological conflicts. Unlike ideological insurgents, who often evade rather than risk battle, or a counter-insurgent govern-

36. David Ress, *The Burundi Ethnic Massacres, 1988* (San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1991), p. 103.

37. Gutman, *Witness to Genocide*, pp. 51, 94, 109–110, 139.

38. Despite claims that the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic division was invented by the Belgians, 1969 census data showed significant physical differences: Tutsi males averaged 5 feet 9 inches and 126 pounds, Hutus 5 feet 5 inches and 131 pounds. Richard F. Nyrop, et al., *Rwanda: A Country Study, 1985* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1985), pp. 46–47, 63.

39. Kit Roane, “Serbs in Croatia Live in World of Hate, Fear,” *San Diego Union-Tribune*, August 19, 1995.

40. Beginning in 1985, the Iraqi government destroyed all rural villages in Kurdistan, as well as animals and orchards, concentrating the Kurdish population in “victory cities” where they could be watched and kept dependent on the government for food. The Turkish government is currently doing the same, while the Burmese government has pursued this strategy against ethnic rebels at least since 1968. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Civil War in Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1991), pp. 7–9; Michael Fredholm, *Burma: Ethnicity and Insurgency* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), pp. 90–92.

ment, which might forbear to attack rather than risk bombarding civilians, ethnic combatants must fight for every piece of land. By contrast, combatants in ethnic wars are much less free to decline unfavorable battles because they cannot afford to abandon any settlement to an enemy who is likely to "cleanse" it by massacre, expulsion, destruction of homes, and possibly colonization. By the time a town can be retaken, its value will have been lost.⁴¹

In ethnic civil wars, military operations are decisive.⁴² Attrition matters because the side's mobilization pools are separate and can be depleted. Most important, since each side's mobilization base is limited to members of its own community in friendly-controlled territory, conquering the enemy's population centers reduces its mobilization base, while loss of friendly settlements reduces one's own. Military control of the entire territory at issue is tantamount to total victory.

SECURITY DILEMMAS IN ETHNIC WARS

The second problem that must be overcome by any remedy for severe ethnic conflict is the security dilemma.⁴³ Regardless of the origins of ethnic strife, once violence (or abuse of state power by one group that controls it) reaches the point that ethnic communities cannot rely on the state to protect them, each community must mobilize to take responsibility for its own security.

Under conditions of anarchy, each group's mobilization constitutes a real threat to the security of others for two reasons. First, the nationalist rhetoric that accompanies mobilization often seems to and often does indicate offensive intent. Under these conditions, group identity itself can be seen by other groups as a threat to their safety.⁴⁴

41. Serbs in Bosnia have destroyed and desecrated mosques, and raped tens of thousands of Muslim women, in part to eradicate the desire of any displaced Muslim to return to a former home. Gutman, *Witness to Genocide*, pp. 68, 70.

42. The political restraints on the use of firepower in ideological disputes do not apply in ethnic wars. Accidentally inflicting collateral damage on enemy civilians does little harm since there was never any chance of gaining their support. Even accidentally hitting friendly civilians, while awkward, will not cause them to defect.

43. While ideological wars may also produce intense security dilemmas for faction leaders who can expect to be treated as criminals if their side loses, most ordinary citizens do not face a severe security dilemma because the winning side will accept their allegiance.

44. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 103–124. Posen argues that nationalism and hypernationalism are driven primarily by the need to supply recruits for mass armies, and are thus likely to be more extreme in new states which lack the capacity to field more capital-intensive and less manpower-intensive forces (pp. 106–107). See also Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80–124.

Second, military capability acquired for defense can usually also be used for offense. Further, offense often has an advantage over defense in inter-community conflict, especially when settlement patterns are inter-mingled, because isolated pockets are harder to hold than to take.⁴⁵

The reality of the mutual security threats means that solutions to ethnic conflicts must do more than undo the causes; until or unless the security dilemma can be reduced or eliminated, neither side can afford to demobilize.

DEMOGRAPHY AND SECURITY DILEMMAS. The severity of ethnic security dilemmas is greatest when demography is most intermixed, weakest when community settlements are most separate.⁴⁶ The more mixed the opposing groups, the stronger the offense in relation to the defense; the more separated they are, the stronger the defense in relation to offense.⁴⁷ When settlement patterns are extremely mixed, both sides are vulnerable to attack not only by organized military forces but also by local militias or gangs from adjacent towns or neighborhoods. Since well-defined fronts are impossible, there is no effective means of defense against such raids. Accordingly, each side has a strong incentive—at both national and local levels—to kill or drive out enemy populations before the enemy does the same to it, as well as to create homogeneous enclaves more practical to defend.⁴⁸

Better, but still bad, are well-defined enclaves with islands of one or both sides' populations behind the other's front. Each side then has an incentive to attack to rescue its surrounded co-ethnics before they are destroyed by the enemy, as well as incentives to wipe out enemy islands behind its own lines, both to pre-empt rescue attempts and to eliminate possible bases for fifth columnists or guerrillas.⁴⁹

45. The breakup of a multi-ethnic state often also creates windows of opportunity by leaving one group in possession of most of the state's military assets, while others are initially defenseless but working rapidly to mobilize their own military capabilities. Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," pp. 108–111.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 108–110.

47. Increased geographic intermixing of ethnic groups often intensifies conflict, particularly if the state is too weak or too biased to assure the security of all groups. Increasing numbers of Jewish settlers in the West Bank had this effect on Israeli-Palestinian relations. A major reason for the failure of the negotiations that preceded the Nigerian civil war was the inability of northern leaders to guarantee the safety of Ibo living in the northern region. Harold D. Nelson, ed., *Nigeria: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1982), p. 55.

48. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5–39. Posen additionally points out that when populations are highly mixed it is easier for small bands of fanatics to initiate and escalate violence, while community leaders can deny responsibility for their actions, or may actually be unable to control them. Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," 109.

49. Although censuses from 1891 on show Greek and Turkish Cypriots gradually segregating themselves by village, violence between these still-intermingled settlements grew from 1955 onward. Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 21.

The safest pattern is a well-defined demographic front that separates nearly homogeneous regions. Such a front can be defended by organized military forces, so populations are not at risk unless defenses are breached. At the same time the strongest motive for attack disappears, since there are few or no endangered co-ethnics behind enemy lines.

Further, offensive and defensive mobilization measures are more distinguishable when populations are separated than when they are mixed. Although hypernationalist political rhetoric, as well as conventional military forces, have both offensive and defensive uses regardless of population settlement patterns, some other forms of ethnic mobilization do not. Local militias and ethnically based local self-governing authorities have both offensive and defensive capabilities when populations are mixed: ethnic militias can become death squads, while local governments dominated by one group can disenfranchise minorities. When populations are separated, however, such local organizations have defensive value only.

WAR AND ETHNIC UNMIXING. Because of the security dilemma, ethnic war causes ethnic unmixing.⁵⁰ The war between Greece and Turkey, the partition of India, the 1948–49 Arab-Israeli war, and the recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan were all followed by emigration or expulsion of most of the minority populations on each side. More than one million Ibo left northern Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil War. Following 1983 pogroms, three-fourths of the Tamil population of Colombo fled to the predominantly Tamil north and east of the island. By the end of 1994, only about 70,000 non-Serbs remained in Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia, with less than 40,000 Serbs still in Muslim and Croat-controlled regions. Of 600,000 Serbs in pre-war Croatia, probably no more than 100,000 remain outside of Serb-controlled eastern Slavonia.⁵¹

Collapse of multi-ethnic states often causes some ethnic unmixing even without war.⁵² The retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans sparked movement of Muslims southward and eastward as well as some unmixing of

50. Unmixing may be dampened when one side is so completely victorious that escape options of members of the losing group are limited. As Sri Lankan forces closed in on the Tamil stronghold of Jaffna in November 1995, some Tamil refugees fled to areas still controlled by Tamil forces, some out of the country, but some to areas behind government lines where relative peace may have offered the best immediate hope of safety. "Ghost Town," *Economist*, November 18, 1995, pp. 39–40.

51. *Fact Sheet: Azerbaijan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, May 2, 1994); Nelson, *Nigeria*, p. 54; Ravindran Casinader, "Sri Lanka: Minority Tamils Face an Uncertain Future," *Inter Press Service*, May 15, 1984; *Balkan War Report*, December 1994–January 1995, p. 5; *World Refugee Survey 1995* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, pp. 128–130).

52. Robert M. Hayden argues that this result is inherent in the nation-state principle. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism and the Wars of Yugoslavia," paper prepared for the Conference on Post-Communism and Ethnic Mobilization, Ithaca, N.Y., April 1995, pp. 12–13.

different Christian peoples in the southern Balkans. Twelve million Germans left Eastern Europe after World War II, one and a half million between 1950 and 1987, and another one and a half million since 1989, essentially dissolving the German diaspora. Of 25 million Russians outside Russia in 1989, as many as three to four million had gone to Russia by the end of 1992. From 1990 to 1993, 200,000 Hungarians left Vojvodina, replaced by 400,000 Serb refugees from other parts of ex-Yugoslavia.⁵³

ETHNIC SEPARATION AND PEACE. Once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, the war cannot end until the populations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions. Even if an international force or an imperial conqueror were to impose peace, the conflict would resume as soon as it left. Even if a national government were somehow re-created despite mutual suspicions, neither group could safely entrust its security to it. Continuing mutual threat also ensures perpetuation of hypernationalist propaganda, both for mobilization and because the plausibility of the threat posed by the enemy gives radical nationalists an unanswerable advantage over moderates in intra-group debates.

Ethnic separation does not guarantee peace, but it allows it. Once populations are separated, both cleansing and rescue imperatives disappear; war is no longer mandatory. At the same time, any attempt to seize more territory requires a major conventional military offensive. Thus the conflict changes from one of mutual pre-emptive ethnic cleansing to something approaching conventional interstate war in which normal deterrence dynamics apply. Mutual deterrence does not guarantee that there will be no further violence, but it reduces the probability of outbreaks, as well as the likely aims and intensity of those that do occur.⁵⁴

There have been no wars among Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey since their population exchanges of the 1920s. Ethnic violence on Cyprus, which reached crisis on several occasions between 1960 and 1974, has been zero since the partition and population exchange which followed Turkish invasion. The Armenian-Azeri ethnic conflict, sparked by independence demands of the mostly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, escalated to full-

53. Rogers Brubaker, "Aftermaths of Empire and Unmixing of Peoples: Historical and Comparative Perspectives," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (April 1995), pp. 189-218; Sheila Marnie and Wendy Slater, "Russia's Refugees," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 37 (September 17, 1993), pp. 46-53; Stan Markotich, "Vojvodina: A Potential Powder Keg," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 46 (November 19, 1993), pp. 13-18.

54. Two additional factors that may enhance deterrence are balancing by third parties and the "aggressor's handicap": states are normally willing to fight harder to avoid losses than to seek gains.

scale war by 1992. Armenian conquest of all of Karabakh together with the land which formerly separated it from Armenia proper, along with displacement of nearly all members of each group from enemy-controlled territories, created a defensible separation with no minorities to fight over, leading to a cease-fire in April 1994.⁵⁵

Theories of Ethnic Peace

Those considering humanitarian intervention to end ethnic civil wars should set as their goal lasting safety, rather than perfect peace. Given the persistence of ethnic rivalries, "safety" is best defined as freedom from threats of ethnic murder, expropriation, or expulsion for the overwhelming majority of civilians of all groups. Absence of formal peace, even occasional terrorism or border skirmishes, would not undermine this, provided that the great majority of civilians are not at risk. "Lasting" must mean that the situation remains stable indefinitely after the intervention forces leave. Truces of weeks, months, or even years do not qualify as lasting safety if ethnic cleansing eventually resumes with full force.

ALTERNATIVES TO SEPARATION

Besides demographic separation, the literature on possible solutions to ethnic conflicts contains four main alternatives: suppression, reconstruction of ethnic identities, power-sharing, and state-building.⁵⁶

SUPPRESSION. Many ethnic civil wars lead to the complete victory of one side and the forcible suppression of the other. This may reduce violence in some cases, but will never be an aim of outsiders considering humanitarian intervention.⁵⁷ Further, remission of violence may be only temporary, as the defeated group usually rebels again at any opportunity.⁵⁸ Even the fact that

55. Russian mediation provided a fig leaf for Azerbaijani acceptance of defeat, but did not cause the outcome. Bill Frelick, *Faultlines of Nationality Conflict: Refugees and Displaced Persons from Armenia and Azerbaijan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1993); Hugh Pope, "Azeris Square Up to a Loser's Peace," *The Independent*, July 29, 1994.

56. Sammy Smooha and Theodore Harf, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict Resolution in Deeply Divided Societies," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 33, Nos. 1-2 (January-April 1992), pp. 26-47, briefly surveys most alternatives. See also Charles William Maynes, "Containing Ethnic Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, No. 90 (Spring 1993), pp. 3-21.

57. On this solution, see Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (April 1979), pp. 325-344.

58. The Kurds in Iraq fought against the government in 1919, 1922-26, 1930, 1931, 1943, 1945-46, 1961-70, 1974-75, 1977, 1983, and 1985-88, and rebelled again when the central government was weakened by the Gulf War in 1991. Senate, *Civil War in Iraq*, pp. 24-26.

certain conquerors, such as the English in Scotland or the Dutch in Friesland, eventually permitted genuine political assimilation after decades of suppression, does not recommend this as a remedy for endangered peoples today.

RECONSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES. The most ambitious program to end ethnic violence would be to reconstruct ethnic identities according to the "Constructivist Model" of nationalism.⁵⁹ Constructivists argue that individual and group identities are fluid, continually being made and re-made in social discourse. Further, these identities are manipulable by political entrepreneurs. Violent ethnic conflicts are the result of pernicious group identities created by hypernationalist myth-making; many inter-group conflicts are quite recent, as are the ethnic identities themselves.⁶⁰

The key is elite rivalries within communities, in which aggressive leaders use hypernationalist propaganda to gain and hold power. History does not matter; whether past inter-community relations have in fact been peaceful or conflictual, leaders can redefine, reinterpret, and invent facts to suit their arguments, including alleged atrocities and exaggerated or imagined threats. This process can feed on itself, as nationalists use the self-fulfilling nature of their arguments both to escalate the conflict and to justify their own power, so that intra-community politics becomes a competition in hypernationalist extremism, and inter-community relations enter a descending spiral of violence.⁶¹

It follows that ethnic conflicts generated by the promotion of pernicious, exclusive identities should be reversible by encouraging individuals and groups to adopt more benign, inclusive identities. Leaders can choose to mobilize support on the basis of broader identities that transcend the ethnic division, such as ideology, class, or civic loyalty to the nation-state. If members

59. Pfaff, "Invitation to War"; Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration"; Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 79–102; Gidon Gottlieb, *Nation Against State* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Stephen Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, 2d ed. (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1995).

60. Malays and Assamese each assert local primacy by terming themselves in their own languages "sons of the soil," even though both are actually recent aggregations of sub-groups. Similarly, Sinhalese claim primacy in Sri Lanka in part based on a largely mythical claim of earlier migration than the Tamils. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 453; David Little, *Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1994), pp. 26–36. Robert Donia and John Fine, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (London, Hurst and Co., 1994), argue that distinct ethnic identities did not exist there before 1875.

61. Brass, *Language, Religion, and Politics in North India*; Stanley J. Tambiah, *Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 130–166; Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, pp. 225–236.

of the opposing groups can be persuaded to adopt a larger identity, ethnic antagonisms should fade away. In 1993 David Owen explained why reconciliation in Bosnia was still possible: "I think it's realistic because these people are of the same ethnic stock. . . . Many people there still see themselves as European and even now don't think of themselves as Muslim, Croat, or Serb."⁶²

However, even if ethnic hostility can be "constructed," there are strong reasons to believe that violent conflicts cannot be "reconstructed" back to ethnic harmony. Identity reconstruction under conditions of intense conflict is probably impossible because once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, they will have already produced, and will continue reproducing, social institutions and discourses that reinforce their group identity and shut out or shout down competing identities.⁶³

Replacement of ethnicity by some other basis for political identification requires that political parties have cross-ethnic appeal, but examples of this in the midst of ethnic violence are virtually impossible to find. In late 1992 Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić attempted to reconstruct Serbian identity in a less nationalist direction. Running for the Serbian presidency against Milošević, Panić promised democratization, economic reform, and ends to the war in Bosnia as well as to UN sanctions. Milošević painted him as a tool of foreign interests, and Panić lost with 34 percent of the vote.⁶⁴

In fact, even ethnic tension far short of war often undermines not just political appeals across ethnic lines but also appeals within a single group for cooperation with other groups. In Yugoslavia in the 1920s, Malaya in the 1940s,

62. "Interview with David Owen on the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 1-9, at 6-7.

63. War may actually create ethnic identities. "Where disaffected *ethnies* become alienated enough to terror and revolt . . . the movement itself can be the prototype and harbinger of a new society and culture. Its cells, schools, guerrilla units, welfare associations, [etc.] all presage and create the nucleus of the future ethnic nation and its political identity, even when secession is prevented and the community fails to obtain its own state." Smith, *National Identity*, p. 137. Bougainvilleans formerly identified themselves primarily by clan, but as a result of their unsuccessful effort to secede from Papua New Guinea, came to divide people primarily between "red skins" (the Papuan enemy) and "black skins" (themselves). Caroline Ifeka, "War and Identity in Melanesia and Africa," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1986), pp. 131-149.

64. Parties aligned with Panić won 21 percent of the National Assembly seats compared to 40 percent for Milošević's party and 29 percent for an even more ultra-nationalist party. Milan Andrejevich, "The Radicalization of Serb Politics," *RFE/RL Research Reports*, Vol. 2, No. 13 (March 26, 1993), pp. 14-24. Similarly, when Fazlal Huq, a Muslim leader in Bengal, tried to promote a moderate line in the 1946 election campaign, he was denounced as a traitor by Muslim League leaders and his party wiped out at the polls. Leonard A. Gordon, "Divided Bengal: Problems of Nationalism and Identity in the 1947 Partition," in Mushirul Hasan, ed., *India's Partition: Strategy, Process, and Mobilization* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 274-317, at 295-301.

Ceylon in the 1950s, and in Nigeria in the 1950s and 1960s, parties that advocated cooperation across ethnic lines proved unable to compete with strictly nationalist parties.⁶⁵

Even if constructivists are right that the ancient past does not matter, recent history does. Intense violence creates personal experiences of fear, misery, and loss which lock people into their group identity and their enemy relationship with the other group. Elite as well as mass opinions are affected; more than 5,000 deaths in the 1946 Calcutta riots convinced many previously optimistic Hindu and Muslim leaders that the groups could not live together.⁶⁶ The Tutsi-controlled government of Burundi, which had witnessed the partial genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda in 1962–63 and survived Hutu-led coup attempts in 1965 and 1969, regarded the 1972 rebellion as another attempt at genocide, and responded by murdering between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutus. Fresh rounds of violence in 1988 and 1993–94 have reinforced the apocalyptic fears of both sides.⁶⁷

Finally, literacy preserves atrocity memories and enhances their use for political mobilization.⁶⁸ The result is that atrocity histories cannot be reconstructed; victims can sometimes be persuaded to accept exaggerated atrocity tales, but cannot be talked out of real ones.⁶⁹ The result is that the bounds of

65. Djilas, *Contested Country*, p. 86; Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 336, 338–339, 635–638, 647. For a civic nationalism project under full peace, see Raymond Breton, "From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English Canada and Quebec," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 85–102.

66. Although Brass, *Language, Religion, and Politics in North India*, argues that Muslim political identity was largely constructed in the 1920s and 1930s by political entrepreneurs painting exaggerated threats, by the mid-1940s the accelerating intercommunal violence was very real. Gordon, "Divided Bengal," pp. 303–304; T.G. Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine: Theory and Practice* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 112–114.

67. Thomas P. Melady, *Burundi: The Tragic Years* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1974), pp. 12, 46–49; René Lemarchand, "Burundi in Comparative Perspective: Dimensions of Ethnic Strife," in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Conflicts* (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 151–171.

68. Ethnic combatants have noticed this. In World War II, the Croatian Ustasha refused to accept educated Serbs as converts because they were assumed to have a national consciousness independent of religion, whereas illiterate peasants were expected to forget their Serbian identity once converted. In 1992 Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansers annihilated the most educated Muslims. Gutman, *Witness to Genocide*, pp. 109–10; Djilas, *The Contested Country*, p. 211 n. 46. Tutsi massacres of Hutus in Burundi in 1972 concentrated on educated people who were seen as potential ethnic leaders, and afterwards the government restricted admission of Hutus to secondary schools. Melady, *Burundi: The Tragic Years*, pp. 46–49; Lemarchand, "Burundi in Comparative Perspective," pp. 161, 168.

69. Exposure of captured Iraqi government records of atrocities committed during the 1985–88 war helped Kurdish leaders mobilize people for the 1991 rebellion. Senate, *Civil War in Iraq*, p. 3; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Kurdistan in the Time of Saddam Hussein* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1991), p. 2.

debate are permanently altered; the leaders who used World War II Croatian atrocities to whip up Serbian nationalism in the 1980s were making use of a resource which, since then, remains always available in Serbian political discourse.⁷⁰

If direct action to transform exclusive ethnic identities into inclusive civic ones is infeasible, outside powers or international institutions could enforce peace temporarily in the hope that reduced security threats would permit moderate leaders within each group to promote the reconstruction of more benign identities. While persuading ethnic war survivors to adopt an overarching identity may be impossible, a sufficiently prolonged period of guaranteed safety might allow moderate leaders to temper some of the most extreme hypernationalism back towards more benign, albeit still separate nationalisms.⁷¹ However, this still leaves both sides vulnerable to later revival of hypernationalism by radical political entrepreneurs, especially after the peacekeepers have left and security threats once again appear more realistic.

POWER-SHARING. The best-developed blueprint for civic peace in multi-ethnic states is power-sharing or "consociational democracy," proposed by Arend Lijphart. This approach assumes that ethnicity is somewhat manipulable, but not so freely as constructivists say.⁷² Ethnic division, however, need not result in conflict; even if political mobilization is organized on ethnic lines, civil politics can be maintained if ethnic elites adhere to a power-sharing bargain that equitably protects all groups. The key components are: 1) joint exercise of governmental power; 2) proportional distribution of government funds and jobs; 3) autonomy on ethnic issues (which, if groups are concentrated territorially, may be achieved by regional federation); and 4) a minority veto on issues of vital importance to each group.⁷³ Even if power-sharing can avert potential ethnic conflicts or dampen mild ones, our concern here is whether it can bring peace under the conditions of intense violence and extreme ethnic mobilization that are likely to motivate intervention.⁷⁴

70. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," p. 151.

71. Van Evera, "Managing the Eastern Crisis," proposes not to dissolve ethnic identities but to remove their xenophobic content by encouraging honest histories of inter-group relations.

72. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (January 1969). In fact, Lijphart argues that diffuse or fluid ethnic identities are undesirable, because design of a power-sharing agreement requires clear identification of the players. Lijphart, "Power Sharing Approach," pp. 499–500.

73. Lijphart cites Belgium as an archetypical example, as well as Malaysia, Canada, India, and Nigeria. "Power-Sharing Approach," pp. 492, 494–96.

74. Lijphart admits that power-sharing is more difficult under conditions of high conflict but prefers it anyway, arguing that pessimism in difficult cases would be self-fulfilling; power-sharing cannot work when it is not tried. *Ibid.*, p. 497. On Yugoslavia, see Vucina Vasović, "A Plea for Consociational Pluralism," in Seroka and Pavlović, eds., *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia*, pp. 173–197.

The answer is no. The indispensable component of any power-sharing deal is a plausible minority veto, one which the strongest side will accept and which the weaker side believes that the stronger will respect. Traditions of stronger loyalties to the state than to parochial groups and histories of inter-ethnic compromise could provide reason for confidence, but in a civil war these will have been destroyed, if they were ever present, by the fighting itself and accompanying ethnic mobilization.⁷⁵

Only a balance of power among the competing groups can provide a “hard” veto—one which the majority must respect. Regional concentration of populations could partially substitute for balanced power if the minority group can credibly threaten to secede if its veto is overridden. In any situation where humanitarian intervention might be considered, however, these conditions too are unlikely to be met. Interventions are likely to be aimed at saving a weak group that cannot defend itself; balanced sides do not need defense. Demographic separation is also unlikely, because if the populations were already separated, the ethnic cleansing and related atrocities which are most likely to provoke intervention would not be occurring.

The core reason why power-sharing cannot resolve ethnic civil wars is that it is inherently voluntaristic; it requires conscious decisions by elites to cooperate to avoid ethnic strife. Under conditions of hypernationalist mobilization and real security threats, group leaders are unlikely to be receptive to compromise, and even if they are, they cannot act without being discredited and replaced by harder-line rivals.

Could outside intervention make power-sharing work? One approach would be to adjust the balance of power between the warring sides to a “hurting stalemate” by arming the weaker side, blockading the stronger, or partially disarming the stronger by direct military intervention. When both sides realize that further fighting will bring them costs but no profit, they will negotiate an agreement.⁷⁶ This can balance power, although if populations are still intermingled it may actually worsen security dilemmas and increase violence—especially against civilians—as both sides eliminate the threats posed by pockets of the opposing group in their midst.

75. Indeed, Lijphart argues that the best way to avoid partition is not to resist it. If minorities, such as the Quebecois, know that they can secede if a satisfactory power-sharing agreement cannot be worked out, this exerts a moderating influence on bargaining. Lijphart, “Power Sharing Approach,” p. 494. In short, partition is unnecessary when it is known to be feasible.

76. I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

Further, once there has been heavy fighting, the sides are likely to distrust each other far too much to entrust any authority to a central government that could potentially be used against them. The 1955–72 Sudanese Civil War was ended, under conditions of stalemate and limited outside pressure, by such an autonomy agreement, but the central government massively violated the agreement, leading to resumption of the war in 1983 and its continuation to the present.⁷⁷

The final approach is international imposition of power-sharing, which requires occupying the country to coerce both sides into accepting the agreement and to prevent inter-ethnic violence until it can be implemented. The interveners, however, cannot bind the stronger side to uphold the agreement after the intervention forces leave. Lijphart argues that power-sharing could have prevented the troubles in Northern Ireland if the British had not guaranteed the Protestants that they would not be forced into union with Ireland, freeing them of the need to cooperate.⁷⁸ However, the union threat would have had to be maintained permanently; otherwise the Protestant majority could tear up the agreement later. The British did impose power-sharing as a condition for Cypriot independence, but it broke down almost immediately. The Greek Cypriots, incensed by what they saw as Turkish Cypriot abuse of their minority veto, simply overrode the veto and operated the government in violation of the constitution.⁷⁹ Similarly, while at independence in 1948 the Sri Lankan constitution banned religious or communal discrimination, the Sinhalese majority promptly disenfranchised half of the Tamils on the grounds that they were actually Indians, and increasingly discriminated against Tamils in education, government employment, and other areas.⁸⁰

STATE-BUILDING. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner argue that states in which government breakdown, economic failure, and internal violence imperil their own citizens and threaten neighboring states can be rescued by international “conservatorship” to administer critical government functions until the

77. The decisive acts were the division of the southern regional government specified in the agreement into three separate states, the imposition of Islamic law on non-Muslims, and—the trigger for violent resistance—an attempt to reduce regional self-defense capabilities by transferring Army units composed of southerners to the north. Ann Mosely Lesch, “External Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War,” in Smock, ed., *Making War and Waging Peace*, pp. 79–106.

78. Lijphart, “Power-Sharing Approach,” pp. 496–497.

79. Richard A. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963–1971* (Waterloo, Iowa: University of Waterloo, 1976).

80. Little, *Invention of Enmity*, pp. 55–56; Sabaratnam, “The Boundaries of the State.”

country can govern itself following a free and fair election.⁸¹ Ideally, the failed state would voluntarily delegate specified functions to an international executor, although in extreme cases involving massive violations of human rights or the prospect of large-scale warfare, the international community could act even without an invitation.⁸²

As with imposing power-sharing, this requires occupying the country (and may require conquering it), coercing all sides to accept a democratic constitution, enforcing peace until elections can be held, and administering the economy and the elections. Conservatorship thus requires even more finesse than enforced power-sharing, and probably more military risks.

Helman and Ratner cite the UN intervention in Cambodia in 1992–93 to create a safe environment for free elections as conservatorship's best success.⁸³ However, this was an ideological war over the governance of Cambodia, not an ethnic conflict over disempowering minorities or dismembering the country. By contrast, the growth of the U.S.-UN mission in Somalia from famine relief to state-rebuilding was a failure, and no one has been so bold as to propose conservatorship for Bosnia or Rwanda.

Even if conservatorship could rapidly, effectively, and cheaply stop an ethnic civil war, rebuild institutions, and ensure free elections, nothing would be gained unless the electoral outcome protected all parties' interests and safety; that is, power-sharing would still be necessary. Thus, in serious ethnic conflicts, conservatorship would only be a more expensive way to reach the same impasse.

ETHNIC SEPARATION

Regardless of the causes of a particular conflict, once communities are mobilized for violence, the reality of mutual security threats prevents both demobi-

81. Helman and Ratner, "Saving Failed States." This proposal shares a number of assumptions with the 1960s nation-building literature; this literature argued that political order in modernizing societies requires strong political institutions which can attract loyalties previously given to traditional tribal, linguistic, cultural, religious, caste, or regional groupings. See Karl A. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York: Atherton, 1963); Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-building and Citizenship* (New York: John Wiley, 1964). As Walker Connor points out, this approach should be termed "state-building," because it centers on strengthening the *state* apparatus in what are often multi-ethnic states. Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, pp. 39–42.

82. Helman and Ratner, "Saving Failed States," p. 13. "If the forces in a country cannot agree upon the basic components of a political settlement—such as free and fair elections—and accept administration by an impartial outside authority pending elections, then the UN Charter should provide a mechanism for direct international trusteeship." *Ibid.*, p. 16.

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 14–17.

lization and de-escalation of hypernationalist discourse. Thus, lasting peace requires removal of the security dilemma. The most effective and in many cases the only way to do this is to separate the ethnic groups. The more intense the violence, the more likely it is that separation will be the only option.

The exact threshold remains an open question. The deductive logic of the problem suggests that the critical variable is fear for survival. Once a majority of either group comes to believe that the killing of noncombatants of their own group is not considered a crime by the other, they cannot accept any governing arrangement that could be captured by the enemy group and used against them.

The most persuasive source of such beliefs is the massacre of civilians, but it is not clear that there is a specific number of incidents or total deaths beyond which ethnic reconciliation becomes impossible. More important is the extent to which wide sections of the attacking group seem to condone the killings, and can be observed doing so by members of target group. In this situation the attacks are likely to be seen as reflecting not just the bloodthirstiness of a particular regime or terrorist faction, but the preference of the opposing group as a whole, which means that no promise of non-repetition can be believed.

Testing this proposition directly requires better data on the attitudes of threatened populations during and after ethnic wars than we now have. Next best is aggregate analysis of the patterns of ends of ethnic wars, supplemented by investigation of individual cases as deeply as the data permits. I make a start at such an analysis below.

HOW ETHNIC WARS HAVE ENDED

The most comprehensive data set of recent and current violent ethnic conflicts has been compiled by Ted Robert Gurr.⁸⁴ This data set includes 27 ethnic civil wars that have ended.⁸⁵ Of these, twelve were ended by complete victory of one side, five by *de jure* or *de facto* partition, and two have been suppressed by military occupation by a third party. Only eight ethnic civil wars have been ended by an agreement that did not partition the country. (See Table 1.)

84. The data set surveyed here combines two overlapping sets presented by Gurr in *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993), pp. 296–297; and Gurr, “Peoples Against States,” pp. 369–375.

85. The data set also includes 25 wars which have not ended; three in which cease-fire or settlement agreements were reached since 1994 but whose status is uncertain; four which represent episodes of ethnic rioting rather than wars over group rights, group autonomy, or territory; and three which were mainly or largely over ideology rather than ethnicity.

Table 1. Ethnic Civil Wars Resolved 1944–94.

Combatants	Dates	Deaths (000s) ¹	Outcome
Military victory (12):			
Karens vs. Myanmar	1945–	43 ²	Defeat imminent
Kurds vs. Iran	1945–80s	40	Suppressed
Tibetans vs. China	1959–89	100	Suppressed
Papuans vs. Indonesia	1964–86	19	Suppressed
Ibo vs. Nigeria	1967–70	2000 ³	Suppressed
Timorese vs. Indonesia	1974–80s	200	Suppressed
Aceh vs. Indonesia	1975–80s	15	Suppressed
Tigreans vs. Ethiopia	1975–91	350 ⁴	Rebels victorious
Uighurs etc. vs. China	1980	2	Suppressed
Bougainville vs. Papua	1988	1	Suppressed
Tutsis vs. Rwanda	1990–94	750 ⁵	Rebels victorious
Shiites vs. Iraq	1991	35	Suppressed
De facto or de jure partition (5):			
Ukrainians vs. USSR	1944–50s	150 ⁶	Suppressed, independent 1991
Lithuanians vs. USSR	1945–52	40 ⁷	Suppressed; independent 1991
Eritreans vs. Ethiopia	1961–91	350	Independent 1993
Armenians vs. Azerbaijan	1988–	15	De facto partition
Somali clans	1988–	350	De facto partition in N., ongoing in S.
Conflict suppressed by ongoing 3rd-party military occupation (2):			
Kurds vs. Iraq	1960–	215	De facto partition
Lebanese Civil War	1975–90	120 ⁸	Nominal power sharing, de facto partition
Settled by agreements other than partition (8):			
Nagas vs. India	1952–75	13 ⁹	Autonomy 1972
Basques vs. Spain	1959–80s	1	Autonomy 1980
Tripuras vs. India	1967–89	13	Autonomy 1972
Palestinians vs. Israel	1968–93	2	Autonomy 1993, partly implemented
Moros vs. Philippines	1972–87	50	Limited autonomy 1990
Chittagong hill peoples vs. Bangladesh	1975–89	24	Limited autonomy 1989
Miskitos vs. Nicaragua	1981–88	<1 ¹⁰	Autonomy 1990
Abkhazians vs. Georgia	1992–93	10	Autonomy 1993

NOTES:

¹ Figures are from Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993), and Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 347–377.

² Gurr gives a combined total of 130,000 for three civil wars in Myanmar. Probably more than one-third of the total is attributable to the Karen.

³ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *Encyclopedia of Military History*, 4th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1993), p. 1447.

⁴ 700,000 for Eritrean and Tigrean rebellions combined, including government forces and civilians, but not rebel combatants. Probably more than half the total attributable to Tigre. Alex de Waal, *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), pp. 3, 5–6.

⁵ Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," *Current History*, Vol. 94, No. 591 (April 1995), pp. 156–161, at 156.

⁶ Includes combatants on both sides, but not civilian losses. Thomas Remeikas, *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania, 1945–1980* (Chicago: Institute of Lithuanian Studies Press, 1980).

⁷ Official Soviet estimate, not including losses by government forces. Heorhii Kasianov communication to author, November 27, 1995.

⁸ Total for 1975–82. Richard A. Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), pp. 45, 164–165.

⁹ Gurr gives a combined total of 25,000 for the Naga and Tripura rebellions together.

¹⁰ *The Reagan Administration's Record on Human Rights in 1986* (New York: The Watch Committees and Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, 1987), pp. 93–94.

The data supports the argument that separation of groups is the key to ending ethnic civil wars. Every case in which the state was preserved by agreement involved a regionally concentrated minority, and in every case the solution reinforced the ethnic role in politics by allowing the regional minority group to control its own destiny through regional autonomy for the areas where it forms a majority of the population. There is not a single case where non-ethnic civil politics were created or restored by reconstruction of ethnic identities, power-sharing coalitions, or state-building.

Further, deaths in these cases average an order of magnitude lower than in the wars which ended either in suppression or partition: less than 13,000, compared about 250,000.⁸⁶ This lends support to the proposition that the more extreme the violence, the less the chances for any form of reconciliation. Finally, it should be noted that all eight of the cases resolved through autonomy involve groups that were largely demographically separated even at the beginning of the conflict, which may help explain why there were fewer deaths.

Intervention to Resolve Ethnic Civil Wars

International interventions that seek to ensure lasting safety for populations endangered by ethnic war—whether by the United Nations, by major powers with global reach, or by regional powers—must be guided by two principles. First, settlements must aim at physically separating the warring communities and establishing a balance of relative strength that makes it unprofitable for either side to attempt to revise the territorial settlement. Second, although economic or military assistance may suffice in some cases, direct military intervention will be necessary when aid to the weaker side would create a window of opportunity for the stronger, or when there is an immediate need to stop ongoing genocide.

DESIGNING SETTLEMENTS

Unless outsiders are willing to provide permanent security guarantees, stable resolution of an ethnic civil war requires separation of the groups into defensible regions.⁸⁷ The critical variable is demography, not sovereignty. Political

86. While it might seem more obvious to measure deaths in proportion to population, the logic of lessons drawn from observing enemy atrocities and the enemy group's reaction to their own atrocities implies that the absolute number of deaths may be a better predictor, although still imperfect.

87. Recent cooperation between the Irish and British governments to guarantee the rights of both groups has reduced the Catholic-Protestant security dilemma in Northern Ireland and allowed

partition without ethnic separation leaves incentives for ethnic cleansing unchanged; it actually increases them if it creates new minorities. Conversely, demographic separation dampens ethnic conflicts even without separate sovereignty, although the more intense the previous fighting, the smaller the prospects for preserving a single state, even if loosely federated.

Partition without ethnic separation increases conflict because, while boundaries of sovereign successor states may provide defensible fronts that reduce the vulnerability of the majority group in each state, stay-behind minorities are completely exposed. Significant irredenta are both a call to their ethnic homeland and a danger to their hosts. They create incentives to mount rescue or ethnic cleansing operations before the situation solidifies. Greece's 1920 invasion of Turkey was justified in this way, while the 1947 decision to partition Palestine generated a civil war in advance of implementation, and the inclusion of Muslim-majority Kashmir within India has helped cause three wars. International recognition of Croatian and Bosnian independence did more to cause than to stop Serbian invasion. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan has the same source, as do concerns over the international security risks of the several Russian diasporas.⁸⁸

Inter-ethnic security dilemmas can be nearly or wholly eliminated without partition if three conditions are met: First, there must be enough demographic separation that ethnic regions do not themselves contain militarily significant minorities. Second, there must be enough regional self-defense capability that abrogating the autonomy of any region would be more costly than any possible motive for doing so. Third, local autonomy must be so complete that minority groups can protect their key interests even lacking any influence at the national level.⁸⁹ Even after an ethnic war, a single state could offer some advantages, not least of which are the economic benefits of a common market. However, potential interveners should recognize that groups that control distinct territories can insist on the *de facto* partition, and often will.

some reduction of tension, but the permanence of peace may depend on the continuation of outside engagement. "Ireland's Premier Assures Protestants in North of Their Rights," *New York Times*, November 4, 1994.

88. Dmitri A. Fadeyev and Vladimir Razuvayev, "Russia and the Western Post-Soviet Republics," in Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov, eds., *Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 107–123, at 116–117; Vitaly V. Naumkin, "Russia and the States of Central Asia and the Caucasus," in *ibid.*, pp. 199–216, 207.

89. This was the preferred solution of Slovenes and Croats within Yugoslavia in 1989–90, and is the *de facto* position of the Herzegovinian Croats within the "Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina" today. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism," p. 20.

While peace requires separation of groups into distinct regions, it does not require total ethnic purity. Rather, remaining minorities must be small enough that the host group does not fear them as either a potential military threat or a possible target for irredentist rescue operations. Before the Krajina offensive, for example, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia is said to have thought that the 12 percent Serb minority in Croatia was too large, but that half as many would be tolerable.⁹⁰ The 173,000 Arabs remaining in Israel by 1951 were too few and too disorganized to be seen as a serious threat.⁹¹

Geographic distribution of minorities is also important; in particular, concentrations near disputed borders or astride strategic communications constitute both a military vulnerability and an irredentist opportunity, and so are likely to spark conflict.⁹² It is not surprising that India's portion of Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, has been at the center of three interstate wars and an ongoing insurgency which continues today, while there has been no international conflict over the hundred million Muslims who live dispersed throughout most of the rest of India, and relatively little violence.⁹³

Where possible, inter-group boundaries should be drawn along the best defensive terrain, such as rivers and mountain ranges. Lines should also be as short as possible, to allow the heaviest possible manning of defensive fronts.⁹⁴ (Croatian forces were able to overrun Krajina in part because its irregular crescent shape meant that 30,000 Krajina Serb forces had to cover a frontier of more than 725 miles.) Access to the sea or to a friendly neighbor is also important, both for trade and for possible military assistance. Successor state arsenals should be encouraged, by aid to the weaker or sanctions on the stronger, to focus on defensive armaments such as towed artillery and anti-aircraft missiles and rockets, while avoiding instruments that could make blitzkrieg attacks possible, such as tanks, fighter-bombers, and mobile artillery.

90. "The Flight of the Krajina Serbs," *Economist*, August 12, 1995, p. 42.

91. Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider, *The Population of Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 30.

92. Because the Arab towns of Lod (Lydda) and Ramle stood astride the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road, when Israeli forces drove out the Arab Legion garrisons in July 1948 they also expelled the inhabitants. Benny Morris, *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 1-2. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, p. 185, says that in 1992 the most militant Serbs in Bosnia were those living in areas whose lines of communication to Serbia were most tenuous.

93. Hindu-Muslim violence has claimed approximately 25,000 lives in Kashmir since 1990, compared to about 3,000 in the rest of India. Gurr, "Peoples Against States," p. 371.

94. Military theorists believe that denser force-to-space ratios tend to shift the offense-defense balance toward defense. Stephen Biddle, "The Determinants of Offensiveness and Defensiveness in Conventional Land Warfare," Harvard University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1992, pp. 164-169.

These conditions would make subsequent offensives exceedingly expensive and likely to fail.

INTERVENTION STRATEGY

The level of international action required to resolve an ethnic war will depend on the military situation on the ground. If there is an existing stalemate along defensible lines, the international community should simply recognize and strengthen it, providing transportation, protection, and resettlement assistance for refugees. However, where one side has the capacity to go on the offensive against the other, intervention will be necessary.

Interventions should therefore almost always be on behalf of the weaker side; the stronger needs no defense. Moreover, unless the international community can agree on a clear aggressor and a clear victim, there is no moral or political case for intervention. If both sides have behaved so badly that there is little to choose between them, intervention should not and probably will not be undertaken.⁹⁵ Almost no one in the West, for instance, has advocated assisting either side in the Croatian-Serb conflict.⁹⁶ While the intervention itself could be carried out by any willing actors, UN sponsorship is highly desirable, most of all to head off possible external aid to the group identified as the aggressor.

The three available tools are sanctions, military aid, and direct military intervention. Economic sanctions have limited leverage against combatants in ethnic wars, who often see their territorial security requirements as absolute. Whereas hyperinflation and economic collapse have apparently reduced Serbian government support for the Bosnian Serb rebels and thus limited the latter's material capabilities, Armenians have already suffered five years of extreme privation rather than give up Nagorno-Karabakh.⁹⁷

Whether military aid to the client can achieve an acceptable territorial outcome depends on the population balance between the sides, the local geography, and the organizational cohesion of the client group. Aid could not enable

95. This is why the strongest advocates of intervention in Bosnia have emphasized Serb crimes, while those opposed to intervention insist on the moral equivalence of the two sides. Anthony Lewis, "Crimes of War," *New York Times*, April 25, 1994; Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 5 (September/October 1995), pp. 22-38.

96. Further, attempts at even-handed intervention rarely achieve their goals, leading either to nearly complete passivity, as in the case of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, or eventually to open combat against one or all sides. At worst, peace-keeping efforts may actually prolong fighting. See Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 20-33.

97. Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), shows that even severe punishment rarely causes concessions on what states see as their homeland territory.

Chechen or Sikh secession, but has been decisive in Abkhazia, and leaks in the embargo have significantly helped Bosnia.⁹⁸ The more serious problem with "arm's length" aid is that it cannot prevent ethnic aggressors from killing members of the client group in territories from which they expect to have to retreat.⁹⁹ Aid also does not restrain possible atrocities by the client group if their military fortunes improve.¹⁰⁰

If the client is too weak to achieve a viable separation with material aid alone, or if either or both sides cannot be trusted to abide by promises of non-retribution against enemy civilians, the international community must designate a separation line and deploy an intervention force to take physical control of the territory on the client's side of the line. We might call this approach "conquer and divide."

The separation campaign is waged as a conventional military operation. The larger the forces committed the better, both to minimize intervenors' casualties and to shorten the campaign by threatening the opponent with overwhelming defeat. Although some argue that any intervention force would become mired in a Vietnam-like quagmire,¹⁰¹ the fundamentally different nature of ethnic conflict means that the main pitfalls to foreign military interventions in ideological insurgencies are either weaker or absent. Most important, the intervenors' intelligence problems are much simpler, since loyalty intelligence is both less important and easier: outsiders can safely assume that members of the allied group are friends and those of the other are enemies. Even if outsiders cannot tell the groups apart, locals can, and the loyalty of guides provided by the local ally can be counted on. As a result, the main intelligence task shifts from assessing loyalties to locating enemy forces, a task of which major power militaries are very capable.

On the ground, the intervenors would begin at one end of the target region and gradually advance to capture the entire target territory, maintaining a continuous front the entire time. It is not necessary to conquer the whole country; indeed, friendly ground forces need never cross the designated line.

98. For an argument that weapons aid and air threats would have been sufficient to end the war in Bosnia, see John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer: A Three-Way Partition Plan for Bosnia and How the U.S. Can Enforce It," *The New Republic*, June 14, 1993, pp. 22–28.

99. Bosnian Serb forces evidently killed several thousand Muslims before retreating from several towns in Northwest Bosnia in October 1995. Chris Hedges, "2 Officials Report New Mass Killings by Bosnian Serbs," *New York Times*, October 20, 1995.

100. Croatian forces attacked Serb refugees fleeing Krajina. Jane Perlez, "Thousands of Serbian Civilians are Caught in Soldiers' Crossfire," *New York Times*, August 9, 1995.

101. Henry Kissinger, "Bosnia Poses Another Vietnam-like Quagmire," *Houston Chronicle*, February 21, 1993; F. Charles Parker, "Vietnam, Bosnia, and the Historical Record," *In Depth*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1993), p. 29.

After enemy forces are driven out of each locality, civilians of the enemy ethnic group who remain behind are interned, to be exchanged after the war. This removes the enemy's local support base, preventing counterinsurgency problems from arising. Enemy civilians should be protected by close supervision of client troops in action, as well as by foreign control of internees.

The final concern is possible massacres of civilians of the client group in territory not yet captured or beyond the planned separation line. Some of this must be expected, since ongoing atrocities are the most likely impetus for outside intervention; the question is whether intervention actually increases the risk of attacks on civilians.¹⁰² A major advantage of a powerful ground presence is that opponent behavior can be coerced by threatening to advance the separation line in retaliation for any atrocities.¹⁰³

Once the military campaign is complete and refugees have been resettled, further reconstruction and military aid may be needed to help the client achieve a viable economy and self-defense capability before the intervenors can depart. The ease of exit will depend on the regional geography and balance of power. Bosnia has sufficient population and skills to be made economically and militarily viable, provided that access to the outside world through Croatia is maintained. Although the weakness of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has required a permanent Turkish garrison, the almost equal weakness of the Greek Cypriots allows the garrison to be small, cheap, and inactive. U.S. Operation Provide Comfort helps secure the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq by prohibiting Iraqi air operations as well as by threatening air strikes against an Iraqi ground invasion of the region. This intervention has no easy exit, however, since the Iraqi Kurds are landlocked and threatened by Turkey, which is waging a war against its own Kurdish minority. Real security for the Kurds might require partitioning Turkey as well as Iraq, a task no outside actor is willing to contemplate.

BOSNIA

Early intervention in Bosnia could have saved most of the lives that have been lost, and secured the Muslims a better territorial deal than they are going to get, but only if the international community had been willing to accept that by

102. Advance announcement of the partition line should reduce at least short-term incentives for ethnic cleansing, since there is no point to cleansing areas which the intervenors will seize anyway, and no need in areas which the intervenors do not propose to attack.

103. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, shows that credible threats to take territory by force do generate coercive leverage.

1992, restoration of civil politics in a multi-ethnic Bosnia had become impossible, and had been able to overcome its squeamishness about large-scale population transfers.

The Vance-Owen plan did not meet the minimum conditions for stable peace because it aimed at preservation of a multi-ethnic state, not ethnic separation. Each of the ten planned cantons would have contained large minorities, and some would have included enclaves totally surrounded by an opposing ethnic group.¹⁰⁴ The 1994 Contact Group proposal to divide Bosnia 51 percent–49 percent between a Muslim-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs would have been better, but incorporated serious instabilities such as the isolated Muslim enclaves of Žepa, Srebrenica, and Goražde, two of which were later overrun with great loss of life.

As the progress of the war has left fewer and fewer unmoved people still to move, more realistic proposals have gradually emerged. The agreement signed at Dayton in November 1995, despite lip service to a unitary Bosnia, ratifies and seeks to strengthen existing territorial divisions. This agreement gives grounds for qualified hope for a stable, relatively peaceful Bosnia.

Future peace in Bosnia depends on resolution of three issues. First and most important, while the military fronts have gradually settled along defensible lines in most areas of the country, serious demographic security dilemmas persist in two places—Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo which both threaten the city's supply lines and are vulnerable themselves, and the surrounded Muslim enclave of Goražde in the Drina Valley.¹⁰⁵

Accordingly, the Dayton agreement requires the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb forces from these Sarajevo suburbs as well as from a corridor stretching from Sarajevo to Goražde, and assigns these areas to the Bosnian government. The Implementation Force (IFOR) is charged with ensuring compliance.¹⁰⁶ The widespread burning of homes by Serbs and others evacuating areas which will

104. The Vance-Owen plan did attempt to provide some regional self-defense by specifying that police would be cantonal while national defense would be supervised by an authority "designated by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia." "Annex: Proposed Constitutional Structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina," International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, document STC/2/2, October 27, 1992. For a survey of several 1992–94 peace proposals, see Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, pp. 302–317.

105. Although the narrow "Posavina Corridor" that links the Eastern and Western parts of Bosnian Serb territory is vulnerable, the Muslims have no irredentist claims or security needs in this area, so fighting is unlikely to begin here although it is a likely site for Muslim retaliation for any Serb provocation elsewhere.

106. "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Annex 1A (U.S. Department of State, November 21, 1995).

pass to control of another group is in a sense encouraging, as it suggests they do not expect to return. More worrisome is the fact that the corridor to Goražde will be only four kilometers wide, leaving the city once again vulnerable after the IFOR departs. A wider corridor here, perhaps in exchange for territory elsewhere, would have been better, even if it meant that more civilians would have to move now.¹⁰⁷

The second issue is that the agreement, at least nominally, seeks to reconstruct some central government institutions with nationwide authority and a rotating presidency. It also requires all parties to permit the return of refugees.¹⁰⁸ These provisions are undesirable and unenforceable, and should be allowed to die quietly. The procedures provided for compensating refugees for lost property should be followed instead.

Third, while some have expressed concern that the Muslim-Croat federation could collapse, leading to a new war between Croats and Muslims, this worry is misplaced.¹⁰⁹ The future legal status of Herzegovina is unimportant; the Herzegovinian Croats have their own army, border posts where Croat and Muslim lines meet, and one-tenth of the seats in Croatia's Parliament. What is important is that, even though the Bihać pocket will remain cut off from other Muslim territory, neither side has an incentive to attack there or elsewhere. There are few co-ethnics for either to rescue from behind the other's lines, and neither can strengthen its strategic position by seizing territory from the other. Croatia needs no Muslim-held territory, and even a U.S.-armed Muslim army will not be strong enough to wage a successful offensive against the Croats.¹¹⁰

RWANDA AND BURUNDI

In general, the more intermingled the competing populations in an ethnic civil war, the greater the scale and ferocity of ethnic cleansing; thus, paradoxically, the greater the need to move people for ethnic separation, the more there are who need to be moved and the harder the task. Despite the urgency of

107. Sean Maguire, "Bosnian Serbs Avert Crisis Over Sarajevo Exodus," *Reuters World Service*, January 12, 1996. For IFOR doubts and Serb threats concerning the long-run safety of Goražde, see Chris Hedges, "Bosnia Enclave Looks Ahead Warily," *New York Times*, December 24, 1995.

108. "Framework Agreement," Annexes 3, 4, and 7.

109. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," *The New Republic*, December 18, 1995, pp. 16–18, 21. My analysis assumes that the Croats will not attempt to retain indefinitely their military control over three tiny enclaves in Central Bosnia which are completely surrounded by Muslim-controlled territory.

110. Any attempt to do so would also cost them all Western military aid and hence the ability to sustain heavy combat operations, as well as inviting a Croatian-Serb combination against them.

separating Rwandan Hutus and Tutsis in April 1994, their relatively even distribution throughout the country would have made it extremely difficult even if outsiders had been willing. Immediate intervention could have saved hundreds of thousands, but would have required the interveners to conquer the entire country, while encouraging Hutus to leave a designated Tutsi homeland as well as rescuing as many Tutsis as possible from the rest of the country.

Rwanda and Burundi today are occupied militarily by their respective Tutsi minorities; nominal power-sharing arrangements in both countries are shams. Hutu insurgencies continue in both countries, however, and in the long run the Tutsis' position in both countries is precarious.¹¹¹

The international community is encouraging Hutu refugees to return to Rwanda and seeking to arrange genuine power-sharing both countries.¹¹² This is the worst thing to do. Instead, the Tutsis of both countries should be encouraged to relocate to a smaller, defensible, ethnically Tutsi state. This state should be supported by international patrons which would guarantee its security, especially by assuring that it would always be well-enough armed to fend off revanchist Hutu ambitions, as well as by persuading neighbors such as Uganda to grant trade access.¹¹³ This would be an immense operation, involving the resettlement of probably more than one quarter of the 13 million combined population of both countries. The alternative, sooner or later, is another genocide.

Objections to Ethnic Separation and Partition

There are five important objections to ethnic separation as policy for resolving ethnic conflicts: that it encourages splintering of states, that population exchanges cause human suffering, that it simply transforms civil wars into inter-

111. Tutsis in Burundi have largely retreated to the major towns; while their position in Rwanda is currently stronger, insurgent activity is more likely to increase than decrease. James C. McKinley, Jr., "In the Grisly Shadow of Rwanda, Ethnic Violence Stalks Burundi," *New York Times*, January 14, 1996; Joyce Hackel, "A Genocide Later, Rwanda Again on Edge," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 28, 1995. The demographics are very uneven; Tutsis make up 14 percent of the population of Burundi, and were 9 percent in Rwanda before the 1994 genocide. See entries for "Rwanda" and "Burundi," *Academic American Encyclopedia* (New York: Grolier Electronic Publishing, 1995).

112. John Lancaster, "Carter, African Leaders Try to Solve Crisis in Rwanda," *Washington Post*, November 29, 1995.

113. The Rwandan Patriotic Front has enjoyed good relations with the Ugandan government. Raymond Bonner, "How Minority Tutsi Won the War," *New York Times*, September 6, 1994.

national ones, that rump states will not be viable, and that, in the end, it does nothing to resolve ethnic antagonisms.¹¹⁴

Among most international organizations, western leaders, and scholars, population exchanges and partition are anathema. They contradict cherished western values of social integration, trample on the international legal norm of state sovereignty, and suggest particular policies that have been condemned by most of the world (e.g., Turkey's unilateral partition of Cyprus). The integrity of states and their borders is usually seen as a paramount principle, while self-determination takes second place.¹¹⁵ In ethnic wars, however, saving lives may require ignoring state-centered legal norms. The legal costs of ethnic separation must be compared to the human consequences, both immediate and long term, if the warring groups are not separated. To paraphrase Winston Churchill: separation is the worst solution, except for all the others.

PARTITION ENCOURAGES SPLINTERING OF STATES

If international interventions for ethnic separation encourage secession attempts elsewhere, they could increase rather than decrease global ethnic violence.¹¹⁶ However, this is unlikely, because government use of force to suppress them makes almost all secession attempts extremely costly; only groups that see no viable alternative try. What intervention can do is reduce loss of life where states are breaking up anyway. An expectation that the international community will never intervene, however, encourages repression of minorities, as in Turkey or the Sudan, and wars of ethnic conquest, as by Serbia.

POPULATION TRANSFERS CAUSE SUFFERING

Separation of intermingled ethnic groups necessarily involves significant refugee flows, usually in both directions. Population transfers during ethnic conflicts have often led to much suffering, so an obvious question is whether

114. Robert Schaeffer, *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990), makes all these criticisms and several others.

115. The UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples says that "all peoples have the right to self-determination" but also that "any attempt aimed at the partial or whole disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." UN Resolution 1514(XV), 1960. For a recent defense of self-determination, see Michael Lind, "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 87-99.

116. Anthony Smith argues that the collapses of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Ethiopia are having such a demonstration effect. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 27-41, 39.

foreign intervention to relocate populations would only increase suffering.¹¹⁷ In fact, however, the biggest cause of suffering in population exchanges is spontaneous refugee movement. Planned population transfers are much safer. When ethnic conflicts turn violent, they generate spontaneous refugee movements as people flee from intense fighting or are kicked out by neighbors, marauding gangs, or a conquering army. Spontaneous refugees frequently suffer direct attack by hostile civilians or armed forces. They often leave precipitately, with inadequate money, transport, or food supplies, and before relief can be organized. They make vulnerable targets for banditry and plunder, and are often so needy as to be likely perpetrators also.¹¹⁸ Planned population exchanges can address all of these risks by preparing refugee relief and security operations in advance.

In the 1947 India-Pakistan exchange, nearly the entire movement of between 12 and 16 million people took place in a few months. The British were surprised by the speed with which this movement took place, and were not ready to control, support, and protect the refugees. Estimates of deaths go as high one million. In the first stages of the population exchanges among Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey in the 1920s, hundreds of thousands of refugees moved spontaneously and many died due to banditry and exposure. When after 1925 the League of Nations deployed capable relief services, the remaining transfers—one million, over 60 percent of the total—were carried out in an organized and planned way, with virtually no losses.¹¹⁹

A related criticism is that transfers require the intervenors to operate *de facto* concentration camps for civilians of the opposing ethnic groups until transfers can be carried out. However, this is safer than the alternatives of administration by the local ally or allowing the war to run its course. As with transfers, the risks to the internees depend on planning and resources.¹²⁰

117. International institutions generally oppose transfers. The position of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is that it is better to bring "safety to people, rather than people to safety." UNHCR, Working Document for the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (1992). As recently as August 1995, the UN proved reluctant to assist Serbs wishing to leave Krajina after its conquest by Croatia. Raymond Bonner, "Croats Celebrate Capturing Capital of Serbian Rebels," *New York Times*, August 8, 1995.

118. Frelick, *Faultlines of Nationality Conflict*, p. 11.

119. Schaeffer, *Warpaths*, 155–56; Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Richard Ned Lebow, *Divided Nations in a Divided World*.

120. Boer civilians interned by the British suffered grievously from insufficient provision of food and shelter, but ethnic Japanese relocated from the west coast in World War II suffered little or no increased incidence of death or illness. Of 120,313 internees, 1,862 died in custody, while there were

SEPARATION MERELY SUBSTITUTES INTERNATIONAL FOR CIVIL WARS

Post-separation wars are possible, motivated either by revanchism or by security fears if one side suspects the other of revisionist plans. The frequency and human cost of such wars, however, must be compared to the likely consequences of not separating. When the alternative is intercommunal slaughter, separation is the only defensible choice.

In fact the record of twentieth-century ethnic partitions is fairly good. The partition of Ireland has produced no interstate violence, although intercommunal violence continues in demographically mixed Northern Ireland. India and Pakistan have fought two wars since partition, one in 1965 over ethnically mixed Kashmir, while the second in 1971 resulted not from Indo-Pakistani state rivalry or Hindu-Muslim religious conflict but from ethnic conflict between (West) Pakistanis and Bengalis. Indian intervention resolved the conflict by enabling the independence of Bangladesh. These wars have been much less dangerous, especially to civilians, than the political and possible physical extinction that Muslims feared if the subcontinent were not divided.¹²¹ The worst post-partition history is probably that of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even here, civilian deaths would almost certainly have been higher without partition. It is difficult even to imagine any alternative; the British could not and would not stay, and neither side would share power or submit to rule by the other.

RUMP STATES WILL NOT BE VIABLE

Many analysts of ethnic conflict question the economic and military viability of partitioned states.¹²² History, however, records no examples of ethnic partitions which failed for economic reasons.¹²³ In any case, intervenors have sub-

5,981 births to the same group. Two people were killed by military police during a demonstration in December 1942. U.S. Department of the Interior War Relocation Authority, *WRA: A Story of Human Conservation* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, no date), pp. 49, 146.

121. Aside from physical security concerns, Muslims also feared that a Congress-dominated India would discriminate against them in public service jobs, education, and land tenure. Lance Brennan, "The Illusion of Security: The Background to Muslim Separatism in the United Provinces," in Hasan, ed., *India's Partition*, pp. 318–355.

122. Schaeffer, *Warpaths*; Kamal S. Shehadi, *Ethnic Determination and the Break-up of States*, Adelphi Paper No. 283 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1993), p. 9. Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," *Foreign Policy*, No. 89 (Winter 1992–93), pp. 21–35, argues that secession states are likely to become both economic failures and undemocratic.

123. Despite considerable economic hardships, in part due to being blockaded by hostile neighbors, Macedonians do not appear ready to give up their independence nor Armenians their territorial claims in Nagorno-Karabakh. Lack of international recognition has depressed economic performance in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but Turkish Cypriots are not interested in recreating the previous Cypriot state.

stantial influence over economic outcomes: they can determine partition lines, guarantee trade access and, if necessary, provide significant aid in relation to the economic sizes of likely candidates. Peace itself also enhances recovery prospects.

Thus the more important issue is military viability, particularly since interventions will most often be in favor of the weaker side. If the client has economic strength comparable to the opponent, it can provide for its own defense. If it does not, the intervenors will have to provide military aid and possibly a security guarantee.

Ensuring the client's security will be made easier by the opponent's scarcity of options for revision. First, any large-scale conventional attack is likely to fail because the intervenors will have drawn the borders for maximum defensibility and ensured that the client is better armed. If necessary, they can lend further assistance through air strikes. Breaking up conventional offensives is what high-technology air power does best.¹²⁴

Second, infiltration of small guerrilla parties, if successful over a period of time, could cause boundaries to become "fuzzy," and eventually to break down. This has been a major concern of some observers of Bosnia, but it should not be. Infiltration can only work where at least some civilians will support, house, feed, and hide the guerrillas. After ethnic separation, however, any infiltrators would be entering a completely hostile region where no one will help them; instead, all will inform on them and cooperate fully with authorities against them. The worst case is probably Israel, where terrorist infiltration has cost lives, but never come close to threatening the state's territorial integrity. Retaliatory capabilities could also allow the client to dampen, even stop, such behavior.¹²⁵

PARTITION DOES NOT RESOLVE ETHNIC HATREDS

It is not clear that it is in anyone's power to resolve ethnic hatreds once there has been large-scale violence, especially murders of civilians. In the long run, however, separation may help reduce inter-ethnic antagonism; once real security threats are reduced, the plausibility of hypernationalist appeals may even-

124. Because they can call on nationalist sentiments to strengthen defensive mobilization, ethnic rump states may be inherently more defensible than their multi-ethnic parents. Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," p. 21 n. 30.

125. The record on this is mixed. The threat of Israeli retaliation did induce the Jordanian and Syrian governments to clamp down on terrorist attacks launched from their territory, but the much weaker (because ethnically fractured) Lebanese state could not.

tually decline.¹²⁶ Certainly ethnic hostility cannot be reduced without separation. As long as either side fears, even intermittently, that it will be attacked by the other, past atrocities and old hatreds can easily be aroused. If, however, it becomes and remains implausible that the other group could ever seriously endanger the nation, hypernationalist drum-beating may fall on deafer and deafer ears.

The only stronger measure would be to attempt a thorough re-engineering of the involved groups' political and social systems, comparable to the rehabilitation of Germany after World War II. The costs would be steep, since this would require conquering the country and occupying it for a long time, possibly for decades. The apparent benignification of Germany suggests that, if the international community is prepared to go this far, this approach could succeed.¹²⁷

Conclusion

Humanitarian intervention to establish lasting safety for peoples endangered by ethnic civil wars is feasible, but only if the international community is prepared to recognize that some shattered states cannot be restored, and that population transfers are sometimes necessary.

Some observers attack separation and partition as immoral, suggesting that partitioning states like Bosnia would ratify the arguments of bloody-minded extremists such as Milošević and Tudjman that ethnic cleansing is necessitated by intractable ancient hatreds, when in fact they themselves whipped up hypernationalist fears for their own political ends. This argument is mistaken. The construction of ethnic hostility might have been contained by intervention in Yugoslav political discourses in the 1980s. It is too late now, but what the international community can still do is to provide surviving Muslims with physical security and a defensible homeland. The claims of justice demand that we go further, to the capture and trial of the aggressors, but that is beyond the

126. Mary E. McIntosh, et al., found that perception of threat—specifically a fear of impending attack from a country associated with the ethnic enemy—was a stronger predictor of ethnic intolerance than any other factor tested, including ethnic makeup of the community, rural versus urban origin, ideology, education, or economic status. McIntosh, "Minority Rights and Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria," *Social Forces*, March 1995.

127. Elmer Pluschke, "Denazification in Germany," in Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Governments in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952*. For a current proposal see Martin van Heuven, "Rehabilitating Serbia," *Foreign Policy*, No. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 38–48.

scope of this article, the focus of which is the minimum requirements for protection of peoples endangered by ethnic war.¹²⁸

Alternatively, one could argue that the Bosnia record demonstrates that the international community cannot muster the will even for much lesser enterprises, let alone the campaigns of conquest envisaged in this paper. Even if this is true, the analysis above has four values. First, it tells us what apparent cheap and easy solutions are *not* viable. Second, it identifies the types of solutions to aim at through lesser means—aid or sanctions—if those are the most that outsiders are willing to do. Third, even if we are not prepared to intervene in certain cases, it explains what we would like other, more interested, powers to do and not do. Fourth, if Western publics and elites understood that the costs of military intervention in ethnic wars are lower, the feasibility higher, and the alternatives fewer than they now believe, perhaps this option would become more politically viable.

Ultimately we have a responsibility to be honest with ourselves as well as with the victims of ethnic wars all over the world. The world's major powers must decide whether they will be willing to spend any of their own soldiers' lives to save strangers, or whether they will continue to offer false hopes to endangered peoples.

128. "Failure . . . to do something about mass murder and genocide corrodes the essence of a democratic society." Leslie Gelb, "Quelling the Teacup Wars," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 2–6, at 6; Hodding Carter, "Punishing Serbia," *Foreign Policy*, No. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 49–56.